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THE EROSION OF MIRANDA: STARE DECISIS
CONSEQUENCES
Leslie A. Lunney*
Assume, for the moment, that the Warren Court's 1966 decision in
Miranda v. Arizona' was wrong. Assume that its combination of required warnings and associated rules limiting custodial police interrogation of criminal suspects improperly rewrote the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination, improperly balanced the interests of
suspects and society, and improperly interfered with the law enforcement
prerogatives of the States and the Court's coequal branches of government. Assume that all of this is true, or at least, with the appointment of
four new Justices to the Court between 1969 and 1971, that a majority of
the Court came to believe that it was.
Even with those assumptions, there is a strong argument that the new
Court should nevertheless abide by the earlier decision. So long as the
Court is to remain a judicial body and not a political one, stare decisis
cautions against simply disregarding existing law in favor of the new
Court's correct (or, at least, temporarily final) interpretation. Facing
such a situation, any action the Court takes, whether it abides by the earlier decision or overrules it, involves costs. If it overrules the earlier decision, the new Court can address the perceived doctrinal error of the
earlier Court but only at the cost of further politicizing the Court. If it
abides by the prior decision, the new Court can restore some of the judicial luster to, and remove some of the political tarnish from the Court as
an institution, but only at the expense of tolerating a mistake in constitutional doctrine and consequential social costs.
In dealing with Miranda, the Burger and, more recently, Rehnquist
Courts have plotted a third course that attempts to avoid the perceived
costs of either abiding by or overruling Miranda. This course consists of

* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law, New Orleans. B.S.N., Univ. of Texas Medical Branch, 1980; J.D., University of Houston Law
Center, 1988; LL.M., Tulane University, 1993. I would like to thank Professors Paul G.
Cassell, Catherine Hancock, Lawrence Moore, S.J., and R. George Wright for reading a
draft of this article and providing me with helpful comments and suggestions. I also
greatly appreciate the research skills of my student assistants, Will Nefzger and Greg
Welsch.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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pretending to abide by Miranda while eviscerating its substance.
Through this course, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts hope for the
benefits associated with both of the first two approaches, without the
costs of either. By keeping Mirandaalive as a symbol while substantially
limiting the decision's reach, they hope to address Miranda'ssupposedly
mistaken interpretation of the Constitution and its potential for undue
costs on law enforcement, while at the same time keeping their actions
too subtle to spark the average person's awareness. The Court hopes
thereby to avoid the perception of political or otherwise improper activism.
Rather than achieve cost-free the benefits of either abiding by or overruling Miranda, however, there is a grave risk that the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' approach to Miranda will achieve just the opposite.
Attempting to rewrite Miranda by dissecting and narrowing its doctrinal
details implicitly acknowledges the validity of Miranda'ssupposedly mistaken core constitutional interpretation, further compounding any constitutional error Miranda made. Similarly, such an approach leaves law enforcement personnel, defense attorneys, and others directly affected by
the rules, generally bound by Miranda, but with certain, often unclear,
exceptions and areas of erosion. As a result, these individuals face not
only the costs of Miranda itself but the tremendous uncertainty of trying
to decipher the maze with which the Court has now surrounded Miranda.
Finally, even to the extent that such an approach avoids the attention of
the average individual, the politically experienced will seldom be fooled
by the Court's misdirection and will recognize the Court's political activism, however packaged, for what it is.
In addition, the course that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
chosen entails one further cost. Almost by definition, the third approach
involves a degree of deception and pretense, of saying one thing while
doing another, not present when the Court honestly abides by or honestly overrules an earlier decision. Given its influence, the Court's use of
duplicity will undoubtedly be imitated by others-other courts, certainly,
and perhaps other actors as well. Over the long term, the increased
deceptiveness likely to result will, on its own, outweigh any advantages
that the Court's chosen path might otherwise generate.
To explore these issues, this Article will consider, in turn, the following: (1) the pre-Miranda limitations on police interrogation and the preMiranda Court's increasing frustration with the failure of these limitations to curb improper psychologically coercive police practices; (2)
Miranda itself; (3) the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' treatment of
Miranda;before finally turning to (4) an analysis of the pragmatic conse-
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quences of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' chosen approach to
Miranda.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR MIRANDA

Miranda has generated spirited debate on such issues as whether the
warning requirements arise from the Constitution, or are instead merely
an exercise of the Court's supervisory powers in the areas of procedure
and evidence, as well as the decision's impact on the criminal justice system and clearance rates.' Some have argued that Miranda represents the
precise sort of raw judicial fiat that should most alarm those who are

2. Compare Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmaticsof Powerlessness in Police Interrogation,103 YALE L.J. 259, 299 n.200 (1993) ("Most later commentators have agreed with the conclusions of these early studies, finding that Miranda has
had little negative effect on criminal prosecutions."), Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456 (1987) ("By the early 1970s, well before the Supreme Court began trimming Miranda, the view that Mirandaposed no barrier to effective
law enforcement had become widely accepted, not only by academics but also by . . .
prominent law enforcement officials .... "), and Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A
Reply to ProfessorCaplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17 (1986) ("Surprisingly, the studies show
that Miranda has had relatively little effect on law enforcement."), with Paul G. Cassell,
The Costs of the Miranda Mandate:A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic"
Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299 (1996) (arguing the costs of Miranda),
Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to
"Reconsidering Miranda," 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 945-48 (1987) (critiquing Schulhofer's
position and asserting that "[tihe main cost of the Miranda rules is the loss of statements
that are never obtained to begin with"), and OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION: TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, (Feb. 12, 1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 510-12
(1989) [hereinafter OLP REPORT] (asserting that various facts reflect Miranda's adverse

impact on law enforcement). The most recent efforts in this regard are found in a series of
articles assessing Miranda's impact. Compare Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical
Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 500
(1995) (arguing that Miranda has substantial benefits and has imposed little cost on law
enforcement), with Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 1084 (1996) (responding to and disputing Professor Schulhofer's analysis). Compare Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 387 (1995) (asserting that Miranda has had substantial
adverse effects on law enforcement efforts), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and
Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 278 (1996) (responding to and disputing Professor
Cassell's analysis). Compare Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A
Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1055 (1998) (attempting to establish substantial costs to efficient law enforcement as
a result of Miranda), and Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After
Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (insisting that
Miranda was responsible for drop in clearance rates), with John J. Donohue III, Did
Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998) (acknowledging
drop in clearance rates, but suggesting that factors other than Miranda were responsible
for the drop).
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concerned about stare decisis,3 and that Miranda represents a departure
from 180 years of previous constitutional doctrine.4 The question of
whether the Miranda Court was unreasonably activist is largely beyond
the scope of this Article, however. Instead, this Article explores the later
Courts' general failure to interpret Miranda honestly, and the potential
damage to the Court's prestige and authority that repeated vacillations in
interpreting constitutional doctrine may produce. Voluntariness as an
admissibility standard is considered in order to introduce certain problems that had arisen in applying the voluntariness test, including the persistent failure of police to apprise suspects of their federal constitutional
rights,5 and the refusal of the lower courts to consider meaningfully the
police's omission of such warnings in determining voluntariness.6
A. Development of the Voluntariness Standard
Although the privilege against self-incrimination occupies a prominent
place in the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court did not address limitations
on the admissibility of confessions until near the end of the nineteenth
century. Initially, the Court, in cases such as Hopt v. Utah7 and Pierce v.
United States,8 dealt with the admissibility of confessions in federal criminal trials as a matter for common law evidentiary rules, and did not refer
to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 9 Within a
few years, however-in fact, the first time the Court excluded a confession as involuntary-the Court relied on the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for excluding an involuntary

3. See generally, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV.
1417 (1985); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65
VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Markman, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 684 (4th Cir. 1999) (observing
that "prior to Miranda, the rule governing the admissibility of confessions in federal
court-if not the rule's justification-remained the same for nearly 180 years: confessions
were admissible at trial if made voluntarily").
5. See infra note 31.
6. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
7. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
8. 160 U.S. 355 (1896).
9. See id. at 357; Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585; see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,
54-55 (1895) (finding the confession admissible without reference to Fifth Amendment,
and explaining that "confinement or imprisonment is not in itself sufficient to justify the
exclusion of a confession, if it appears to have been voluntary, and was not obtained by
putting the prisoner in fear or by promises"); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
105, 111 (1997) (observing that "[a]t common law, confessions were excluded only when
there was a concern as to their reliability" (emphasis removed)).

1999]

The Erosion of Miranda

or "coerced" confession in a federal criminal trial.' Whether tied to the
common law or the Fifth Amendment, the Court phrased the test for
admissibility in terms of whether the confession was "made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.""
In 1936, the Court crafted a similar rule to govern the admissibility of
confessions in state criminal proceedings under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.'2 Although tied to a different constitu-

10. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (holding that in federal
criminal trials, "wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because
not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself"').
11. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896); accord Pierce, 160 U.S. at 357;
Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585. In Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924), the Court emphasized that "[i]n the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession
is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made." The Court later supplemented this standard with the McNabb-Mallory rule, which rendered inadmissible in
federal criminal trials "incriminating statements elicited from defendants during a period
of unlawful detention." Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453, 455-56 (1957) (reversing a conviction based, in part, upon confession obtained from defendant where police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant, arrested him, detained him for four and onehalf hours, questioning him for two of those hours, without bringing defendant before a
committing magistrate, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)). Earlier
in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943), the Court held that:
[L]egislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important
safeguard-not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing
conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive
and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to
those reprehensible practices known as the "third degree" which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use. It aims to avoid all the
evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.
accord Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (reaffirming the McNabb rule
that "a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure promptly
to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is the
result of torture, physical or psychological"' (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S.
65, 68 (1944)); cf. also James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, S.J., The McNabb-Mallory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-21 (1958) (discussing the content of
the McNabb-Mallory rule in the context of prompt arraignment).
12. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936) (reversing conviction because authorities coerced confessions). In dealing with the admissibility of confessions in
state court trials, the Court initially left enforcement of the privilege against selfincrimination to the States, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply directly to state court proceedings, and refusing to enforce the privilege through either the
Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99, 113-14 (1908), overruled in part by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-54 (1947);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1937).
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tional provision, the admissibility standard for state proceedings also focused on whether the confession was "voluntary,, 13 and in practice, the
Court treated the state and federal inquiries as interchangeable, citing
decisions under the rule for federal proceedings in cases involving state
proceedings, and vice versa. 4 Taken together, the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause prohibited the use of a coerced confession against a defendant in any federal or
state criminal trial, respectively.15
B. The Shift Towards Bright-Line Rules
While the totality of the circumstances test

6

went a long way toward

13. See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 65 (1951) ("So far as due process affects
admissions before trial of the defendant, the accepted test is their voluntariness."); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940);
Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 39 & n.2 (1951) (citing Lisenba,
314 U.S. at 239, a case involving admissibility of a confession in a state court proceeding, in
a case involving the admissibility of a confession in a federal court proceeding); see also
Gallegos, 342 U.S. at 65 (citing McNabb, 318 U.S. at 346, as authority in interpreting the
admissibility rule for confessions in state court proceedings); see also McHenry v. United
States, 308 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1962) (applying Court cases dealing with admissibility
of confessions in state proceedings to determine admissibility of confession in federal proceeding); Note, Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 961 (1966)
(discussing the merger of the state and federal inquiries).
15. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (1944) ("Taken together, the
Bram and Lisenba cases hold that a coerced or compelled confession cannot be used to
convict a defendant in any state or federal court.").
16. Although the Court had long considered all of the circumstances surrounding a
confession to determine whether it was voluntary, the "totality of the circumstances" language first appeared in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) ("The totality of the
circumstances that preceded the confessions in this case goes beyond the allowable limits."). In conducting this inquiry, the Court considered such factors as whether the suspect
was interrogated for an extended period of time, interrogated in relays, denied food, rest,
or other physical needs, see, e.g., Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 154, as well as the suspect's age, intelligence, race, education, and whether the suspect had been advised of his federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963) (finding that
failure to warn a suspect of his federal constitutional rights was one factor in determining
whether confession was voluntary); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631-35
(1961)(same); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958) (same); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1949) (same); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949)
(same); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912) (same); Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613, 623-24 (1896) (same); see also Bernard Weisberg, Police Interrogation
of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 21,
28-29 (1961) (discussing Court's differing rationales and reliance on differing factors in
determining "voluntariness"). Use of brutality, torture, beating, starvation, or physical
pain during interrogation rendered the suspect's confession or statement prima facie involuntary. See Ashcraft, 332 U.S. at 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Brown, 297 U.S.
at 286-87 (holding that admission of confessions obtained through torture was "a wrong so
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discouraging physically abusive police practices," the test encountered
more difficulty in preventing police use of psychological coercion to elicit
incriminating responses. 18 Although the Court made clear, on several ocfundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial"). More subtle
pressures were judged by a "weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power
of resistance of the person confessing." Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953); see
also Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958) (quoting Stein, 346 U.S. at 185, for the
same proposition); Fikes, 352 U.S. at 197 (same).
17. Certainly, there is good reason to believe that the test did not eliminate such
practices altogether. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 865, 872 (1981) (reviewing YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980)) (noting that the voluntariness standard, by expressly allowing "some" pressure to be placed on suspect, left the door open
for "sincere, dedicated investigators, intent on solving brutal crimes, occasionally [to]
los[e] their tempers").
18. See Honorable Charles E. Glennon & Tayebe Shah-Mirani, Illinois v. Perkins:
Approving the Use of Police Trickery in Prison to Circumvent Miranda, 21 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 811, 813 (1990) (noting that "in pre-Miranda decisions, the Court focused primarily
upon the use of physical force by the police in order to obtain a confession"; during the
years from Brown to Miranda, however, police used a variety of tactics aside from beatings, and threats of beatings, to elicit incriminating responses). Central to all of these
"psychological" approaches is the isolation of the individual from friends, family, and his
attorney, and the placement of the individual within the control of the police. See id.; see
also Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514 ("We cannot blind ourselves to what experience unmistakably teaches: that even apart from the express threat, the basic techniques present herethe secret and incommunicado detention and interrogation-are devices adapted and used
to extort confessions from suspects."). If isolation and incommunicado detention alone
were insufficient, the suspect, once isolated and in police control, could be exposed to a
variety of techniques designed to elicit incriminating statements, including relentless, accusatory questioning undertaken at odd hours employing, if necessary, trickery, deception,
and false accusation, and using teams of officers intended to play alternatively on the individual's fears and sympathies. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 631-34 (describing tactics used to
break Culombe's will and force his confession once he was in police custody, including,
inter alia, extended, repeated questioning and use of wife and daughter to extract confession); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322-24 (1959) (describing tactics used to extract
confession, including repeated, extended questioning conducted during the night, and use
of childhood friend to play on the suspect's sympathies and lie to suspect); Watts, 338 U.S.
at 53 (describing the tactics used to extract confession as including incommunicado detention, solitary confinement in a cell "aptly enough called 'the hole,"' five night-time sessions of questioning, and trips around town designed to elicit information concerning the
individual's suspected crimes); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598 (1948) (stating that tactics
used to extract confession included incommunicado detention and isolation of individual
from family and attorney, with extended questioning from midnight to five a.m.); Ashcraft,
322 U.S. at 153-54 (describing relentless questioning of individual held incommunicado as
"inherently coercive"); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-58 (1966) (describing various psychological techniques used to extract incriminating information); Charles S.
Potts, The PreliminaryExamination and The Third Degree, 2 BAYLOR L. REV. 131, 134-42
(1950); David L. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J.
PUB. L. 25, 37-46 (1965); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 581, 602-28 (1979). Through such tactics, the process of interrogation "implies that it is better for the prisoner to answer than to persist in the refusal of disclosure
which is his constitutional right." Watts, 338 U.S. at 54; see also Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514
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casions, that psychological pressures alone could render a confession involuntary," application of the voluntariness standard in such cases
proved difficult and controversial.20 In part, these difficulties stemmed
from the admissibility standard's purported focus on "voluntariness. ' 21 If
"voluntariness" is taken literally, it might be thought to prohibit any degree of coercion, and allow only those confessions that were truly volunteered. But even Justice Frankfurter refused to give such a reading to
the standard: "[a] statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered., 22 At the other extreme, an action might be thought voluntary so
(noting that "the petitioner was alone [with] ... the police and he had 'no reason not to
believe that the police had ample power to carry out their threats,'. . . to continue, for a
much longer period if need be, the incommunicado detention").
19. See Watts, 338 U.S. at 52 (noting that "[t]here is torture of mind as well as body;
the will is as much affected by fear as by force"); see also Payne, 356 U.S. at 566 (stating
that the fact "[t]hat petitioner was not physically tortured affords no answer to the question whether the confession was coerced").
20. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 321 (discussing difficulty in assessing voluntariness because
of increased sophistication in law enforcement techniques). For examples of the split decisions that resulted from the Court's attempts to apply the voluntariness standard to confessions found coerced by psychological pressures alone, see Culombe, 367 U.S. at 568,
635-42 (six Justices in four separate opinions finding confession involuntary, with three
Justices dissenting); Harris,338 U.S. at 68, 71-73 (three Justice plurality, two Justices concurring separately, and four Justices dissenting to Court's ruling that confession was involuntary); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63, 66 (1949) (three Justice plurality, two Justices concurring separately, and four Justices dissenting to Court's ruling that confession
was involuntary); Watts, 338 U.S. at 49, 53-61 (three Justice plurality, three Justices concurring separately, and three Justices dissenting to Court's ruling that confession was involuntary); Haley, 332 U.S. at 597, 599, 601, 606-07 (four Justice plurality, one Justice concurring, and four Justices dissenting to Court's ruling that confession was involuntary);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 402, 420, 430, 434 (1945) (four Justice plurality, two
Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part, and three Justices dissenting to Court's
ruling that confession was involuntary); see also Caplan, supra note 3, at 1431-33 (describing the test for voluntariness as a "hybrid").
21. See Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogationand the
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
62, 72-73 (1966) ("Judicial decisions speak in terms of the 'voluntariness' of a confession,
but the term itself provides little guidance."); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 457 (1964) ("Moreover, the
sweep of the confessions rule is mitigated in practice by the Court's own adherence to the
terminology of voluntariness which hides the values now underlying the confessions
rule."); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Crime and Confession, 79 HARV. L. REV. 21, 37 (1965)
("The underlying vice in the confession cases is the involuntary 'voluntariness' which until
recently we have somehow come to think adequate to justify depriving a man of a deeprooted constitutional privilege."); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 29 ("The ambiguous concepts of coercion and free choice have invited dispute.").
22. Watts, 338 U.S. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion); see also Ashcraft, 322
U.S. at 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Writing for the dissent, Justice Jackson made a similar argument:
To speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being "voluntary" or
"uncoerced" is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional.
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long as it was a "product of a sentient choice."23 But the decision to yield
to pressure, even extreme pressure, represents such a choice, and so voluntariness might be read to exclude only those few confessions where the
individual has been literally forced to speak.24 The Court rejected this
extreme as well, however, and refused to read "voluntariness" to encompass choices "constrained" or "coerced" by undue physical or psychological pressures.25
In part, the difficulties with applying the voluntariness standard to control psychological coercion were the result of the Court's internal disagreements concerning the proper balancing of the interests of suspect
and society, and of federal and state governments, at stake in the confession cases." The voluntariness test also called for a fact-intensive analyA confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty person
gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser. The Court bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner for thirty-six
hours is "inherently coercive." Of course it is. And so is custody and examination for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention. When
not justified, infliction of such indignities upon the person is actionable as a tort.
Of course such acts put pressure upon the prisoner to answer questions, to answer them truthfully, and to confess if guilty.
Id.
23. Haley, 332 U.S. at 606 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24. See id. ("It would disregard standards that we cherish as part of our faith in the
strength and well-being of a rational, civilized society to hold that a confession is 'voluntary' simply because the confession is the product of sentient choice. 'Conduct under duress involves a choice ... "' (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S.
67, 70 (1918))); see also Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 72-73 ("Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements-even those made under brutal treatment-are 'voluntary' in the sense
of representing a choice of alternatives."); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's ConstitutionalDifficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 182 & n.47 (1988)
[hereinafter Grano, Schulhofer Reply] ("Even a person being tortured makes a conscious
choice between yielding to the pressure and resisting further.").
25. See, e.g., Haley, 332 U.S. at 606 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 3, at 1434 ("The Court was, it is true, often divided in
its judgments, but the fragmentation was less a by-product of the voluntariness standard
than a reflection of deep cleavages in society that were at last becoming apparent."); cf
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Police Practicesand the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge,
50 CAL. L. REV. 11, 14-15 (1962) (noting clash between proponents of constitutional values on one side and proponents of effective police practices on other); Henry J. Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 938-40 (1965)
(arguing that the Court should hesitate to impose its views on States, and suggesting that
Court's recent moves to control state criminal procedure were "reminiscent of Lochner v.
New York"); Sutherland, Jr., supra note 21, at 24-27 (noting the arguments that police interrogation is essential to effective policing); Roger J. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process
in CriminalDetection, Detention and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 674-77 (1966) (noting
the conflict between effective enforcement of privilege against self-incrimination and effective detection and prosecution of crime). Thus, decisions limiting, or dissents arguing
for limits to, the scope of constitutional protections for criminal defendants typically re-
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sis that: (1) inevitably led to a "swearing contest" between the defendant
and the police as to the circumstances of the interrogation,27 (2) entailed
substantial use of judicial resources, and (3) prevented effective appellate
28
guidance and control of trial court application of the test.
ferred both to the need for deference to a State's judgment concerning proper forms of
criminal procedure, and to the need to avoid limiting the police's ability to use seemingly
effective crime solving techniques. See, e.g., Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 510 (1958)
(rejecting defendant's constitutional claim while recognizing that "it is of the 'very essence
of our federalism that the States should have the widest latitude in the administration of
their own systems of criminal justice"' (quoting Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468
(1958))); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 156, 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (beginning dissent by observing that "[a] sovereign State is now before us" and then warning that Court's increasing "hostility to mere interrogation . . . [risks] unduly fettering the States in protecting society from the criminal); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239 (1941) (emphasizing need
for deference when dealing "with the system of criminal administration of California, a
quasi-sovereign").
27. See Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal
to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1834 (1987); see also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The trial of the issue of coercion is seldom helpful. Law officers usually testify one way, the accused another.");
Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 870-71; David Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court:
Trends and Countertrends, 13 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 414 (1982). In an attempt to avoid
undue involvement in the fact-finding process, the Court would rely only on "undisputed"
facts in resolving the voluntariness issue. See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2210-12 (1996) (noting "the Court's refusal to consider claims of coercion that rested upon 'disputed' facts"). But this approach severely
limited the Court's ability to ensure that state and lower federal courts were abiding by the
Court's rulings.
28. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 635-36 (1961) (Warren, C. J.,
concurring) (warning that general principles are of little help in resolving voluntariness
issue, and suggesting that nature of issue effectively compels "a case-by-case approach");
see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 683 (1984) (recounting some history of preMiranda analysis: "Difficulties of proof and subtleties of interrogation technique made it
impossible ... for the judiciary to decide with confidence whether the defendant had voluntarily confessed his guilt or whether his testimony had been unconstitutionally compelled. Courts ... [nationwide] were spending countless hours reviewing the facts of individual custodial interrogations.");YALE KAMISAR, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, in
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41, 69-76

(1980); Yale Kamisar, Foreword:Brewer v. Williams A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209, 234-35 (1977) (noting that the traditional litigation process typically
produces a record inadequate to the task of making sensible judgments concerning the extent or nature of police pressure applied to a suspect); Ogletree, supra note 27, at 1834
("The case-by-case analysis proved inadequate in a second way, because it provided the
Court with scant opportunity to shape and direct the behavior of law enforcement officers."); Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 869 (noting that the voluntariness test left police with
little guidance); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that "the records in these cases
usually contain very little information about the circumstances of the interrogation and
even less information about the defendant's state of mind"); White, Defending Miranda,
supra note 2, at 7-8 ("But long before Miranda, it was widely recognized that, in most
cases, the adversary process was not equipped to give anything close to an accurate picture
of what happened at the police station."); White, supra note 18, at 595-96, 598 ("[T]he un-
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With the appointment of Chief Justice Warren in 1954, and Justice
Brennan in 1958, the Court began to focus more closely on the psycho29
logical tactics associated with modern police interrogation practices.
Initially, the Court attempted to address such tactics through a stricter
application of the voluntariness standard.0 Despite the Court's repeated

warnings concerning the importance of failing to apprise a suspect of his
federal constitutional rights, however, state courts essentially ignored this
factor in determining voluntariness.31 Faced with state courts that refused to penalize police officers for failing to apprise a suspect of his federal constitutional rights,32 the Court began to explore ways to impose
predictability of the voluntariness test greatly limits its usefulness as a legal standard for
the control of police trickery in interrogation .... Beyond that, however, the 'totality of
circumstances' test's fatal flaw is its failure to generate precedents that can serve as guidelines for the police and the lower courts.").
29. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963); Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 321-23 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 566-67 (1958).
30. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 516-17 (ruling that finder of fact must expressly consider
whether suspect was warned of constitutional rights prior to interrogation in making voluntariness determination); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (citing youth of
defendant, coupled with extended isolation, as factors that likely would be psychologically
coercive in obtaining a confession from a minor). In Spano, the Court stated:
The facts of no case recently in this Court have quite approached the brutal
beatings in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), or the 36 consecutive hours
of questioning present in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). But as law
enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to extract
confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more delicate
judgments to be made.
360 U.S. at 321; see also Payne, 356 U.S. at 566-67 (highlighting psychologically coercive
tactics used to secure confession from a "19-year-old youth").
31. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1966) (noting that "[t]here is
no indication in the record that police advised [defendant] ... of his rights until after he
had confessed orally on the 16th day" of custody and describing failure to warn as "asignificant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made"); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 493-94 (1966) (discussing refusal of the trial court in Vignera to
charge jury to consider whether warnings were given in determining voluntariness of confession); Haynes, 373 U.S. at 510-11 ("Nor is there any indication in the record that prior
to signing the written confession, or even thereafter, Haynes was advised by authorities of
his right to remain silent, warned that his answers might be used against him, or told of his
rights respecting consultation with an attorney."); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613,
623-24 (1896) (noting that failure to warn Wilson of his right to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel created a "conflict of evidence as to whether a confession is or is not
voluntary," but not sufficient in this case to remove the question of voluntariness from the
jury); HONORABLE NATHAN R. SOBEL, THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS: MIRANDA

ARIZONA 20 (1966) (noting that "[s]tate courts gave that circumstance [e.g. failure to
warn] very little weight" in determining whether a confession was coerced).
32. See White, supra note 18, at 598 (observing that "[b]y the early sixties, however,
experience had demonstrated that the 'totality of circumstances' test was an ineffective
means of preventing unacceptable police pressures").
V.
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rigid, inescapable warning requirements on police officials.
With the addition of Justice Stewart in 1959, five members of the
Court appeared ready to look elsewhere for a means to address such coercion, and had expressed their opinion that the right to assistance of
counsel placed limitations on police interrogation, at least where the
questioning occurred after the defendant had been indicted.33 This position became the law in 1964, through the Court's decisions in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 4 Massiah v. United States,3 5 and Escobedo v. Illinois.3 6 These

decisions worked together, first extending the application of the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel to the States in Gideon v.
Wainwright," and then, extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
to police questioning that occurred prior to the initiation of judicial or
adversarial proceedings in Escobedo.38 Although there was some reason
for optimism that this approach, by effectively requiring the presence of
counsel during police questioning, would constrain improper psychological coercion, it did not prove entirely satisfactory. First, the holding in
Escobedo as to when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached was

33. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324-27 (concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Stewart, joined by Justices Black and Brennan). A year earlier, Chief Justice Warren had
joined Justice Douglas's concurrence in Crooker v. California expressing a similar requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment. 357 U.S. 433, 442 (1958) (Douglas, J. concurring, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan) (stating that the
refusal to accede to suspect's demand for attorney during custodial interrogation was "a
denial of that due process of law guaranteed the citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment").
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
36. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
37. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342. The Court's shift to the Sixth Amendment as the
foundation for building its confession doctrine was made possible by the Court's conclusion in Gideon that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel was a fundamental right safeguarded against state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 344 (observing that "[t]he right of one charged with crime
to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries,
but it is in ours"). In the following Term, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment was
violated by police use of an informant to question surreptitiously a defendant without his
counsel present, when (1) the defendant had been indicted, and (2) was out on bail, and
therefore, not in police custody. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03, 206.
38. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91. In this case, the Court held that Escobedo had
been denied "Assistance of Counsel" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment when
he was questioned in the absence of counsel, and the following factors were present: (1)
the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to
focus on Escobedo; (2) Escobedo had been taken into police custody; (3) the police
"carr[ied] out a process of interrogations that len[t] itself to eliciting incriminating statements"; (4) Escobedo requested and was denied an opportunity to consult with his attorney; and (5) police failed to warn Escobedo effectively of "his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent." Id.
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quite fact-intensive, and it became difficult to predict whether the Sixth
Amendment had been violated when the facts differed in any significant
respect from those in Escobedo. 9 Second, the application of the Sixth
Amendment's assistance of counsel requirement to police-suspect interrogations conducted at the pre-indictment stage represented a clear expansion of the Sixth Amendment right,40 and therefore faced considerable resistance in both state and lower federal courts.4'
Although these difficulties with the Sixth Amendment approach could
perhaps have been overcome, the Court turned instead to the Fifth
Amendment's proscription against compelled self-incrimination as the
proper means of insuring that suspects are adequately protected against
psychologically coercive interrogation tactics. The Fifth Amendment
approach became a viable alternative in 1964, when the Court, in Malloy

39. See, e.g., State v. McLeod, 203 N.E.2d 349, 350-52 (Ohio 1964) (affirming conviction obtained with statements made in absence of counsel on remand from the Court's
suggestion that the decision be reconsidered in light of Massiah, because the Court said
Massiah was limited to its facts), rev'd without op. 381 U.S. 356 (1965); see also Traynor,
supra note 26, at 671-73 (noting the confusion that arose from the rule set forth in Escobedo).
40. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 493-94 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (observing that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel had previously attached only after
the criminal investigation had ended and adversarial proceedings had commenced);
Traynor, supra note 26, at 668-69:
In extending the right to counsel to the prearraignment stage, the Court promulgated a rule not only of dim contours but also of hazy constitutional derivation
from the [S]ixth [A]mendment. Though there had been a drift in this direction,
there was scant warning that the Court would so swiftly take command ....
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Donald C. Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a
Fourteenth Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 143, 146-51 (1965) (tracing the evolution of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel from Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), to Gideon, Massiah, and Escobedo);
Arnold N. Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States
and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 49-53 (1964) (discussing the right to counsel before the Court decided Escobedo and Massiah); Friendly, supra note 26, at 942-48
(same); Herman, supra note 21, at 481-95 (same).
41. See, e.g., People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d 33, 35 (11. 1964) (finding that a denial
of the right to counsel required both failure to warn defendant of his right to silence and a
refusal of his request to consult an attorney); Campbell v. State, 384 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tenn.
1964) (noting the statement of the trial judge in a colloquy with defense counsel concerning the admissibility of an oral confession, "'and this court is not going to be bound by
what the Federal courts have said about it"'); see also SOBEL, supra note 31, at 20-21, 27,
37, 46-47; Dowling, supra note 40, at 143, 145, 155 & n.82 (noting critiques of, and state
court refusals to give a fair reading to, Escobedo); Traynor, supra note 26, at 669-73
(warning that an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment's right to assistance of counsel represents a serious threat to judicial authority and to effective police work).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 48:727

v. Hogan, reconsidered its initial position and made the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the States by incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 In this way, the stage was set for the Court to turn to the Fifth
Amendment as the basis for its Mirandadecision.
II. MIRANDA
In 1966, the Court heard argument in a quartet of cases that would become the now-famous decision, Miranda v. Arizona.45 In each of the four
cases, the police had taken an individual into custody and questioned
him, eliciting incriminating statements that were introduced into evi42. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
43. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's initial position
that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination did not apply to the States,
either directly, by virtue of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93, 99, 113-14 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In reversing this position, the Malloy Court observed that
"[t]he Court has not hesitated to re-examine past decisions according the Fourteenth
Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic liberties than that which was
contemplated by its Framers when they added the Amendment to our constitutional
scheme." Malloy, 378 U.S. at 5.
44. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. In addition to concluding that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Malloy Court also ruled that the admissibility of confessions in either
federal or state prosecutions would be examined under the federal standard set out in
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-7 (quoting the
Brain standard as "'wherever a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the self-incrimination] portion of the Fifth
Amendment"'); see also supra text accompanying notes 12-15. The Malloy Court noted
that the shift to the federal standard, which the Court stated had already begun in several
earlier cases, reflected the recognition that the Fifth Amendment's privilege was an "essential mainstay" of America's accusatorial criminal justice system. See Malloy, 378 U.S.
at 7 (citing, in the following order, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Haynes v. Washington,
373 U.S. 503 (1963)); see also Traynor, supra note 26, at 667. Some commentators viewed
this shift to the Self-Incrimination Clause as a basis for excluding confessions in state
criminal proceedings as being of questionable pedigree, because the Court had relied almost exclusively on the Due Process Clause to evaluate the admissibility of confessions in
state proceedings in the years preceding the Malloy decision. See Herman, supra note 21,
at 465-66 (describing Malloy as "a shotgun wedding of the privilege to the confessions
rule"). But see Sutherland, Jr., supra note 21, at 35 ("When the Supreme Court on June
15, 1964, decided in Malloy v. Hogan that the privilege against self-incrimination, formulated in the [F]ifth [A]mendment, operates as a restriction on the states under the due
process clause of the [F]ourteenth, the ruling should not have surprised anyone .... ").
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The quartet of cases were: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v.
New York, Westover v. United States, and Californiav. Stewart. See id. at 436 n.*.
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dence at the individual's subsequent criminal trial; from their convictions, the individuals appealed, arguing that the statements given in response to police questioning were improperly admitted.46
In approaching these cases, there were several directions the Court
could have taken in analyzing the admissibility of the incriminating
statements. As three of the defendants had plausible arguments for
overturning their convictions based upon the voluntariness standard, the
Court could have used these cases to develop further the more rigorous
voluntariness analysis it had begun to articulate in Haynes v. Washington.47 Alternatively, because each of the defendants had plausible claims
under Escobedo that the questioning violated their Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel, the Court could have used these cases to
define more specifically when the right to assistance of counsel at-

46. See id. at 445, 491-99 (describing the proceedings in each case).
47. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513-15. Of the four cases addressed in Miranda, the defendant in Stewart had the strongest argument that his confession was coerced under the
voluntariness standard. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. On the basis of a tip, police went to
Stewart's home to arrest him. See id. at 497. While there, the officers obtained Stewart's
consent to search the house and discovered several items taken from robbery victims. See
id. At the time of his arrest, the police also arrested Stewart's wife and three people visiting his house. See id. Although there was no evidence to connect Stewart's wife or the
other three visitors to the crimes, all five were held for nearly a week until Stewart finally
confessed. See id. Further, Stewart steadfastly maintained his innocence through the first
eight questioning sessions, and only confessed during the ninth session. See id.
While the circumstances surrounding Vignera's confession did not reveal excessive or
otherwise improper police pressure under the traditional due process analysis, the trial
court had refused to charge the jury that one factor for consideration in determining
whether the statements were voluntary was the failure of the police to warn Vignera of his
right to remain silent prior to questioning. See id. at 493-94. In Haynes, the Court had
ruled that the failure to include the absence of warnings as a factor in determining voluntariness required reversal of a conviction based in part upon a confession. See Haynes, 373
U.S. at 517 ("Whatever independent consequence ... [the failure to warn a suspect of his
constitutional rights] may otherwise have, they are unquestionably attendant circumstances which the accused is entitled to have appropriately considered in determining voluntariness and admissibility of his confession.").
Westover had, at least, a plausible argument that his confession was coerced under traditional voluntariness standards. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 495. He had been in custody for
over fourteen hours, and had been interrogated at length, by state and federal officers, before confessing. See id. at 495-96. On the other hand, Miranda had confessed readily after
his arrest, making it difficult to find that his confessions had been coerced under the traditional voluntariness analysis. See id. at 491-92 (noting that Miranda confessed within two
hours of his arrest and onset of questioning).
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tached.48 The Court chose neither of these paths, however.49 Instead, the
Court relied upon the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled
self-incrimination, made applicable to the States in Malloy, as the basis
for limiting the admissibility of confessions obtained by the questioning
of individuals in police custody. Specifically, the Court held that when an
individual is subjected to "custodial police interrogation," police must
follow certain procedural safeguards before evidence or statements obtained as a result of such interrogation can be used against the individual
in a criminal trial. 0 As the Court explained, unless other "fully effective
means" were devised to apprise the individual of his rights, the following
now-familiar warnings must be given prior to any questioning of an individual in custody: (1) that "he has a right to remain silent"; (2) "that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him"; (3) "that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney" prior to questioning and to
have counsel present during any questioning; and (4) "that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him."'"
In justifying its ruling, the Court explained that custodial interrogation
exerts a practical compulsion to speak, that is, if not dispelled, a threat to
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. With such
custodial interrogation, an individual is "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. 5 3 He
is "questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in
a room in which he [is] cut off from the outside world. 5 4 The Court de-

48. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498 (noting that the California Supreme Court had reversed the conviction of Stewart because the questioning violated Stewart's right to assistance of counsel under Escobedo); see also JEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 296 (1997 ed.) (noting a statement made by the

late John J. Flynn, Miranda's lawyer before the Supreme Court, that he and others "had
'agreed that the briefs should be written with the entire focus on the Sixth Amendment
[right to counsel] because that is where the Court was headed after Escobedo,' but 'in the
very first paragraph... Chief Justice Warren said [in effect], 'It is the Fifth Amendment..
that is at issue today"' (alterations in original)).
49. In 1972, the Burger Court limited Escobedo to its facts. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
50. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
51. Id. at 444, 471, 473, 479.
52. See id. at 478 (noting that "when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the [Fifth Amendment] privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized"); see
also Glennon & Shah-Mirani, supra note 18, at 813-14 (arguing that "incommunicado interrogation . . .casts doubt upon the voluntariness of a subsequently obtained confession").
53. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
54. Id. at 445.
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scribed this sort of questioning as "incommunicado interrogation of indi55 For the Miranda Court, the
viduals
S . in56a police-dominated atmosphere."
isolation, the setting, the psychological ploys often used, and the trickery sometimes employed during custodial interrogation57 were "created
for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner. 5 8 In such a setting, "no statement obtained from the defen55. Id.
56. See id. at 449 (quoting police manuals that observed that the "'principle psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the
person under interrogation"'). This tactic is effective because
"[tlhe subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own
home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware
of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior
within the walls of his home. Moreover, his family and other friends are nearby,
their presence lending moral support. In his own office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces
of the law."
Id. at 449-50 (quoting police manual).
57. See id. at 448. In the course of its decision, the Court relied heavily on FRED E.
INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962), as evi-

dence of the techniques and tactics available to police to place psychological pressure on
an individual to confess. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-455. In applying these tactics,
known collectively as the "third degree," the Court identified "privacy"-the isolation of
the individual with the police-as the central consideration. See id. at 449, 455. Once isolated, the officer can employ accusatory questioning techniques that assume the individual's guilt, while minimizing the moral seriousness of the offense or offering legal excuses
or pretended sympathy for the individual's supposed actions. See id. at 450-51. If necessary, overt psychological ploys, such as the "Mutt and Jeff" approach, with a team of officers playing alternately sympathetic and hostile roles, or false accusation or other trickery
can be employed. See id. at 452-53; see also Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 21, at 73 (listing deceptive practices police employ to obtain a confession). Once isolated, requests for
an attorney or to speak with family can be ignored or used as a means for reemphasizing
the individual's need to speak, because the police are advised to use the following tactic:
"[T]he interrogator should respond by suggesting that the subject first tell the
truth to the interrogator himself rather than get anyone else involved in the matter. If the request is for an attorney, the interrogator may suggest that the subject save himself or his family the expense of any such professional service, particularly if he is innocent of the offense under investigation."
Miranda,384 U.S. at 453, 454 (quoting INBAU & REID, supra, at 57). If all else fails, simple persistence, with patient, relentless questioning, can eventually wear down an individual's resistance. See id. at 451, 455 (citing CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 112 (1956)).

Miranda,384 U.S. at 457. As the Miranda Court explained:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The current practice of
incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most cherished
principles-that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inher-

58.
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dant can truly be the product of his free choice."'5 9

Requiring warnings at the outset of such questioning would, the
Miranda Court believed, tend to dispel the inherently coercive atmosphere that would otherwise arise during custodial interrogation. 60 To
complement the required warnings and ensure that they could not be
easily circumvented, the Court also crafted a number of parallel enforcement rules.6' Initially, once the warnings had been given, the police
were not to question the individual unless he had made a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights.62 If the "individual indicate[d] in any manner" that he wished to remain silent, either
before or during questioning, then the interrogation had to cease.61 If the
person under interrogation stated that he wanted an attorney, the interrogation could not continue until an attorney was present. 64 In addition,
ent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice.
Id. at 457-58 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 456, 458 ("In other settings, these individuals might have exercised their
constitutional rights. In the incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere, they succumbed."); see also Sutherland, Jr., supra note 21, at 36-37 ("The man who under these
circumstances 'voluntarily' surrenders his right to remain silent, who gives away his constitutional shield, designed alike for the guilty and the innocent, surrenders it under circumstances in which no other legal act would be sustained as 'voluntary' by any court anywhere."). Although the Court's use of "free choice" language alludes to the Court's
voluntariness approach to determining the admissibility of confessions, the Court expressly noted that, absent the warnings, a confession would be inadmissible even if it
would have been found "voluntary" under the traditional test. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
457 ("In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth
Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest.").
60. See id. at 467-69 (noting that warnings would inform those unaware of the privilege of their rights and of "consequences of foregoing it," "show the individual that his
interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it," and
"make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary
system").
61. See id. at 444-45 (stating that the prosecution must promulgate procedural safeguards in order to use statements made during custodial interrogation, and describing
methods of enforcing these protections).
62. See id. at 444. To determine waiver for situations involving custodial interrogation, the Court applied the "high standards of proof" for waiver of a constitutional right.
See id. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
63. See id. at 473-74. As the Miranda Court explained, "[a]t this point he has shown
that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the
person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise." Id. at 474. Moreover, "[t]he mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements.., does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." Id. at 445.
64. See id. at 474.
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to ensure that an individual was not penalized for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege while undergoing police custodial interrogation,
the Miranda Court barred the prosecution from using at trial the fact that
the individual "stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation."65
Taken together, the warnings and these enforcement rules were intended to redress the "potentiality for compulsion" otherwise present in
custodial interrogation, and thereby "protect precious Fifth Amendment
rights."66 Although the Court recognized that this protection would
come at some expense to "society's need for interrogation," the Court
believed that the limits it placed on the interrogation process would "not
constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement."67
III. INROADS ON MIRANDA

From the outset, Miranda met with something less than universal acclaim. In Miranda itself, four Justices dissented from the Court's decision, and at least one of the dissenters remained so adamant in his opposition to Miranda that he refused to accord the decision any weight under
stare decisis years after it was rendered.68 Commentators and politicians
65. Id. at 468 n.37. This parallel enforcement rule reiterated the Court's holding in
Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609 (1965), that a prosecutor in state court proceedings may
not comment on a defendant's decision to remain silent. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15.
66. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. As the Court explained:
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion
described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where
there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.
Id. at 461.
67. Id. at 479, 481. The Court explained its conclusion:
In announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of the burdens which
law enforcement officials must bear, often under trying circumstances. We also
fully recognize the obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal laws.
This Court, while protecting individual rights, has always given ample latitude to
law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of their duties.
Id. at 481.
68. See id. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting in part); id. at 504 (Harlan, J.,
Stewart, J.,
and
White, J., dissenting); see also Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 331 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (rejecting Justice Harlan's reluctant recognition of Miranda's principles in later
cases on the basis of stare decisis). Another dissenter, Justice White, was also intensely
opposed to the Miranda decision, but in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), he pro-
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proclaimed the decision a disaster for law enforcement, and attacked
Miranda as an illegitimate and misguided instance of judicial fiat. With
the appointment of Chief Justice Burger to replace Chief Justice Warren
in 1969, and the addition of Justice Blackmun (initially, a conservative)
in 1970, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1971, the political balance
on the Court shifted sharply. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and
Justice Blackmun each replaced one of the Justices who had joined
Miranda'sfive Justice majority. These Justices, and Justice Rehnquist as
well, largely shared the views of the Miranda dissenters. Yet, given that
one of the central criticisms of Miranda was its activism and failure to
abide by existing law, the new majority was unwilling simply to overturn
Miranda as that would, in a sense, represent the very sort of activism it
found so troubling about Miranda itself. A quick reversal of Miranda
would not only hint at hypocrisy, but given the extent to which Miranda
had, for good or ill, captured the public's attention, reversal would tend
to reveal, to an uncomfortable extent, the Court as a political, rather
than judicial, actor.6 9 Rather than overturn Miranda, the Burger and
later Rehnquist Courts set about to limit its reach by interpreting
Miranda's requirements narrowly and crafting exceptions to its commands. To open the door for these approaches, and to provide the Court
with the flexibility to treat Miranda as it saw fit, the Burger Court's most
fundamental assault on Miranda involved questioning its constitutional
pedigree.
A. Miranda Deconstitutionalized
Even a superficial reading of the Miranda opinion reveals that the
Miranda Court viewed its decision as an application of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 0 In justifying the
vided the key fifth vote for Justice Souter's majority opinion ensuring that federal courts
could review, as part of a habeas corpus proceeding, state court decisions concerning alleged Mirandaviolations. See id. at 681.
69. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting):
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different
from the two political branches of Government. No misconception could do
more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding
mission to serve.
Id.; see also Sonenshein, supra note 27, at 461 (surmising that "[i]n
Tucker, the Court even
appeared to deny Miranda'sjurisprudential legitimacy, inexplicably failing to overrule the
Warren Court holding, perhaps because protestations of awed respect for precedent
bound the majority's hands").
70. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 442 (alluding to the Fifth Amendment in observing that
"our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles
long recognized and applied in other settings"); id. at 445 ("The constitutional issue we
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warnings and parallel enforcement rules, the Miranda Court began with
the voluntariness standard, and the proposition that a confession is not
admissible unless "truly the product of free choice., 7 ' The Court then
examined the circumstances of in-custody interrogation, and found compulsion inherent in the process. 2 Unless this compulsion was somehow
dispelled, "no statement obtained... [from in-custody interrogation] can
truly be the product of [an individual's] free choice., 73 Through this reasoning, the Court equated the results of in-custody interrogation with
statements unconstitutionally compelled, unless steps were taken to disenvironment.7 1
pel the compulsion otherwise inherent in the custodial
Toward this end, the Miranda Court devised the warning and parallel enforcement rules to dispel this compulsion and thereby "assure that the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered., 75 Given this reasoning, the Miranda warnings and associated enforcement rules were not arbitrary constitutional embellishments in any
sense, but were constitutionally required in order for statements obtained through in-custody interrogation to satisfy the dictates of the Self-

decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant
questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."); id. at 459-60 (discussing the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and
noting that it "has always been 'as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard"'
and stating "[w]e cannot depart from this noble heritage" (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892), rev'd on other grounds, Kastigar v. United. States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972))). The Court discussed the historical origins and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in over eight pages of Miranda's text. See Miranda384 U.S. at 458-68.
71. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 464-65 ("The voluntariness doctrine in the state cases,
as Malloy indicates, encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert such
pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.").
72. See id. at 458, 461 ("An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion
described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak."); id. at 465 (discussing the Court's decision in Malloy, and explaining that "the compelling atmosphere of
the in-custody interrogation, and not an independent decision on [Malloy's] part, caused
the defendant to speak"); id. at 467 ("We have concluded that without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist
and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.").
73. Id. at 458.
74. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1993) (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)); see also Glennon & Shah-Mirani, supra note 18, at 814 ("[A] confession
would be deemed voluntary only if the accused had been apprised of his [Flifth
[A]mendment privilege prior to the custodial interrogation."). See generally Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 2, at 440-53 (explicating Miranda's presumption of custodial interrogation as inherently compelling).
75. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
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Incrimination Clause.76 As the Miranda Court explained, the requirement of warning a suspect about his federal constitutional rights and obtaining an informed waiver of those rights prior to custodial interrogation
was "fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege.",77 The
Court continued to express this view in the early years after Miranda.8
By the early 1970s, however, the membership and the politics of the
Court had changed, and the Court itself began to express doubt as to
Miranda's constitutional basis. The view of Miranda's requirements as
something less than constitutional first appeared in 1974 in Michigan v.
Tucker.79 Joined by one of the dissenters from Miranda,""and the three
Justices appointed since Miranda was decided, 8 then-Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, suggested that Miranda had merely "recommended" a series of procedural safeguards, which "were not themselves
76. See id. at 467. Although the Miranda Court was careful to acknowledge that the
Constitution did not require "adherence to any particular solution" for providing a suspect
with the necessary information and obtaining his informed waiver, "unless we are shown
other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards
[described in Miranda] must be observed." Id. The Court also explained that it was not
attempting to create "a constitutional straightjacket," and invited Congress and the States
to devise equally effective procedures to protect individual's rights. See id.
77. Id. at 476. Moreover, the Mirandadecision itself clearly distinguished between its
holding, and other constitutionally-required protections, and the protections afforded defendants in federal criminal trials established under the Court's supervisory power. See id.
at 463-65 (distinguishing between protections established under supervisory power over
federal courts and constitutional protections required in state court proceedings); Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 348 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Miranda's requirement of
warnings and an effective waiver was not merely an exercise of supervisory authority over
interrogation practices."); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 465-66 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Miranda's purpose was not promulgation of judicially preferred
standards for police interrogation, a function we are quite powerless to perform; the decision enunciated 'constitutional standards for protection of the privilege' against selfincrimination." (emphasis in original) (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 491)).
78. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (holding that "the use of these
admissions obtained in the absence of the required [Miranda]warnings was a flat violation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. 1, 3 (1968) (observing that the Miranda opinion stated "at some length the constitutional reasons" for requiring the prescribed warnings prior to custodial interrogation).
79. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
80. See supra note 68 (noting the dissenting Justices in Miranda). Justice Stewart,
one of the Miranda dissenters, joined Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Tucker. See
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 434. Justice White, another dissenter from Miranda, concurred separately, but also expressed doubt concerning Miranda'sconstitutional stature. See id. at 460
("For the reasons stated in my dissent in that case, I continue to think that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was ill-conceived and without warrant in the Constitution.").
81. Chief Justice Burger, appointed in 1969, Justice Blackmun, appointed in 1970,
and Justice Powell, appointed in 1971, all joined Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. See
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 434.
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rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure
that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected."82 In
support of its view that Miranda warnings were not constitutional in origin, the Tucker Court, quoting Miranda, stated, "'the Constitution [does
not] necessarily require[] adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions' associated with custodial interrogation." But the
Tucker Court omitted the remainder of Miranda'sdiscussion of this issue
in which the Miranda Court unequivocally stated that unless equally effective procedures were used to protect individual rights, the Miranda
safeguards "must be observed." 8
The theme that Miranda warnings were mere prophylactic safeguards
that were not themselves required by the Constitution reemerged in later
Court decisions." However, neither the Burger nor the Rehnquist Court
has shown a willingness, as yet, to follow through on these comments.
The Court has, for example, avoided the constitutional issue of how the
Court could require the States to enforce Miranda if Miranda were not
constitutional in origin.86 The Court has also avoided a similar issue
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda,384 U.S. at 467).
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also supra text accompanying notes 50-59 & 66-

67.
85. To show the development of this theme, the cases are cited in order of decision.
See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) ("The prophylactic Miranda warnings
therefore are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected."' (alterations in original) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444)); id. at 671 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings
violates only a nonconstitutional prophylactic"); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
306 (1985) (noting that "[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment
and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in
the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528
(1987) (noting that Miranda's warnings requirement is not a dictate of the Fifth Amendment itself, but a prophylactic rule); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (same);
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (same); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
176 (1991) (same).
86. Cf.Tucker, 417 U.S. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (observing that "[tihe Court
is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis");
see also OLP REPORT, supra note 2, at 526-27. The Office of Legal Policy of the United
States Justice Department said the following concerning this issue:
There is, however, a more fundamental sense in which the doctrinal changes
reflected in these decisions make it mysterious how Miranda can continue to be
applied at all in a case in which Miranda is violated in an interrogation, but no actual compulsion takes place. Under the Supreme Court's current case law, no
violation of the [F]ifth [A]mendment occurs at the interrogation in such a case ..
Nevertheless, Miranda requires that [the suspect's statements] be excluded...
•.. [Under these circumstances, the Court] could preserve Miranda only by
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raised by Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of
1968, codified as section 3501 of title 18 of the United States Code.87 Enacted specifically in response to the Miranda decision,88 section 3501 appears to make voluntariness the exclusive prerequisite for a confession's
admissibility in federal criminal trials.89 If so enforced, section 3501
would seem to conflict directly with Miranda,9° and thereby present a
clear constitutional challenge: if Miranda was constitutional in origin,
Congress would lack the authority legislatively to reverse it. 9' On the
other hand, if Miranda was not a constitutional mandate, then Congress
could legislatively overrule it, thereby exposing the underlying constitutional issue of how the Miranda Court could impose the decision's requirements on the States in the first place. 92 The Department of Justice
avowing a supervisory power over the state courts ....
Id.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)-(b) (1994) ("Admissibility of confessions").
88. See S. REP. No. 1097, at 41, 50-51 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2127, 2137 (criticizing Miranda and describing it as inflicting a "most disastrous blow to
the cause of law enforcement in this country"). The Report also stated the following:
The committee is convinced from the mass of evidence heard by the subcommittee, much of which is printed in the transcript of hearings, that the rigid and
inflexible requirements of the majority opinion in the Miranda case are unreasonable, unrealistic, and extremely harmful to law enforcement. Instance after
instance are documented in the transcript where the most vicious criminals have
gone unpunished, even though they had voluntarily confessed their guilt.
•.. The Committee alines itself whole-heartedly with the view expressed by
the dissenting Justices and with what it feels are the views of the vast majority of
judges, lawyers and plain citizens of our country who are so obviously aroused at
the unrealistic opinions such as the Miranda decision which are having the effect
of daily releasing upon the public vicious criminals who have voluntarily confessed their guilt.
Id. at 41, 50, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2132, 2136-37.
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (providing that "a confession ... shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given").
90. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). While section 3501 directed the court to consider as part
of the voluntariness analysis whether the defendant had known or been advised of his
right to remain silent and his right to assistance of counsel, the failure to apprise the defendant of his rights did not necessarily render any resulting confession inadmissible-an
approach that directly contradicted Miranda. See id. ("The presence or absence of any of
the above-mentioned factors [including notice of the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel] ... need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.").
91. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress does
not possess the legislative authority to supersede a Supreme Court decision construing the
Constitution).
92. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (observing that with respect to
cases tried in state courts, the Supreme Court's "authority is limited to enforcing the
commands of the United States Constitution"); see also OLP REPORT, supra note 2, at
543. The Office of Legal Policy argued that
[t]he current Court has repudiated the premises on which Miranda was based,
but has drawn back from recognizing the full implications of its decisions. We
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has been reluctant to press for resolution of this conflict, however, and
when it has pressed the issue, courts have, until recently, found ways to
avoid it, generally by finding that Miranda was satisfied in any event.93
are left with admittedly non-constitutional rules that continue to be applied in
both federal and state proceedings, despite a contrary Act of Congress at the
federal level and an admitted lack of supervisory authority to enforce such rules
against the state courts.
Id.; see also Joseph D. Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 395, 405 & n.42-43 (1989) ("This is what makes
the legitimacy question so apparent, for we know that the Supreme Court has no supervisory power over state courts or state law enforcement agencies."); Susan R. Klein,
Miranda Deconstitutionalized:When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act
Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 431 (1994) (observing that commentators and the preReno Department of Justice have "forcefully argued" that the Court lacked authority under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution to reverse state criminal convictions in the
absence of a constitutional violation). See generally Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules
in Criminal Procedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 100 (1985)
[hereinafter Grano, ProphylaticRules] (questioning the legitimacy of Miranda).
93. Although President Johnson reluctantly signed section 3501 into law, he stated in
his signing statement that he believed the section was unconstitutional, and his Attorney
General, Ramsey Clark, instructed the U.S. Attorneys to offer into evidence only those
confessions that satisfied Miranda's dictates. See Daniel Gandara; Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions:Implementation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305, 311-12 (1974). With the arrival of the Nixon administration in 1969, the new Attorney General, John Mitchell, attempted to press for
resolution of the issue of whether section 3501 had displaced Miranda'srequirements. See
id. at 312. In the early 1970s, U.S. Attorneys raised the issue and pressed for its resolution
in a number of cases, but the courts avoided the issue, generally by finding that Miranda's
requirements had been satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115, 124 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("In view of the Mirandawarnings and waiver, there
is no need ...[here] even remotely to consider whether ...§ 3501, which purport[s] to
make a confession 'admissible in evidence if it is voluntary' are operative to rescue a confession that violates the constitutional rights safeguarded by Miranda." (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (1994))); United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Inasmuch as we
hold defendant Vigo's statements voluntary and admissible under the requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona, they are similarly voluntary and admissible under the requirements of
18 U.S.C. § 3501. It is therefore unnecessary to reach the question of the application and
constitutionality of § 3501." (citation omitted)); United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373,
379 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, C.J., concurring) (assuming that the majority opinion did not
intend to overrule Miranda or address its constitutionality); Ailsworth v. United States,
448 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1971) ("We decline in this case to reach the issues presented by
§ 3501."); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d Cir. 1970) (same); Gandara, supra,
at 313-16 (discussing the application of Miranda in federal and state courts). In terms of
displacing Miranda, until recently, the most that has been accomplished was the Tenth
Circuit's ruling in United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975), where the court
appeared to embrace section 3501. See id. at 1136-38. The panel's endorsement of the
section 3501 guidelines represented an alternative holding by the court, because the panel
also found Miranda'srequirements to have been satisfied. See id. at 1138. Challenges to
Miranda's constitutional basis have recently begun to succeed, however. A Utah trial
judge recently relied on Crocker 's alternative holding in upholding section 3501's constitutionality, and applying its guidelines to determine the admissibility of the defendant's
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As a result, the apparent constitutional collision between section 3501
and Miranda remains unresolved.94 Further, when the proper characterization of Miranda'sconstitutional stature could have made a substantive
difference, Justice White and Justice Blackmun, both of whom had
joined earlier Court decisions impugning Miranda's constitutional stature,95 refused to use the "prophylactic" characterization to restrict habeas
statements. See United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1436 (D. Utah 1997)
(applying section 3501 to determine voluntariness despite apparent Miranda violation due
to continued questioning after defendant had invoked Miranda rights). Consistent with
many of the earlier cases, the Government had taken the "curious position" of agreeing
with the defendant that section 3501 was unconstitutional, while the Safe Streets Coalition
was given permission by the court to file an amicus curiae brief arguing in favor of section
3501's constitutionality. See id. at 1430.
94. The Fourth Circuit has recently held that section 3501's guidelines, rather than
the Miranda requirements, represent the proper admissibility analysis in the federal
courts, and refused to suppress an incriminating, but voluntary, statement given in violation of Miranda. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999). In
Dickerson, the Government raised the section 3501 issue in its motion for reconsideration
at the trial court level, but did not brief this issue in its interlocutory appeal to the Fourth
Circuit. See id. at 680-81 (observing that the Department of Justice had taken the "unusual step" of prohibiting the U.S. Attorney's office from briefing the section 3501 issue).
Notwithstanding the Government's failure to rely on section 3501, the Fourth Circuit upheld the statute as a legitimate exercise of "Congress's unquestioned power to establish
the rules of procedure and evidence in the federal courts." Id. at 692. The Fourth Circuit
did not address the question of how Miranda's requirements could have been imposed on
the States if the decision lacked a constitutional basis.
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that at least some of the Justices may be ready
to tackle this constitutional issue. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S.
350, 351 (1994) (describing section 3501 as "the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions"). This comment from Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, appears to support the argument that section 3501, rather than Miranda, governs
the admissibility of confessions in federal criminal prosecutions. Such a conclusion was
unnecessary for the Court to reach in the context of the Alvarez-Sanchez facts, however,
and, in fact, the Court thereafter continued to apply the Miranda analysis in prosecutions
by the United States, perhaps, in part, because the Government continued to refuse to rely
on section 3501. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994) (observing that
the Government had not relied on section 3501 in arguing the case and that the Court
would be "reluctant" to consider the applicability of this statute when "the Department of
Justice expressly declines to take a position"). Inhis concurrence, Justice Scalia expressed
his willingness to consider whether the confession in Davis was voluntary under section
3501. See id. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that notwithstanding prudential concerns that would generally lead the Court to avoid consideration of arguments not raised
by the Government, it would be appropriate to consider the applicability of section 3501
"when a case that comes within the terms of this statute is next presented to us"). Therefore, Miranda's continued validity as constitutional doctrine may soon come before the
Court.
95. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 299, 305-07 (1985) (Blackmun and White, JJ.,
joining Court's opinion) (describing Miranda warnings as "prophylactic ... [but] 'not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution' (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984) (citations omitted)); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 650, 654 (Blackmun and White,
JJ., joining Court's opinion) (describing Miranda safeguards as "prophylactic" rules); see
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review of alleged Miranda violations.96
Taken together, these indications of unwillingness to follow
through on the language questioning Miranda'sconstitutional status suggests that, at least for some members of the Court, such discussions are
largely an exercise in judicial disparagement. 7 These statements may set
the stage for overruling Miranda at some point in the future, but for the
present, they serve to undermine Miranda directly, by signaling courts
that the present Court will not be overly concerned by unduly-narrow
readings of Miranda, and indirectly, by providing both rationale and excuse for narrowing Miranda'sscope and implementation. Both the Burger Court, in the past and, more recently, the Rehnquist Courts have
taken full advantage of the opportunity thereby created, as the following
sections explore.
B. Erosion of the Miranda Triggers: Custody and Interrogation
In Miranda, the Court identified two triggers for determining when the
9
BeMiranda warnings would be required: custody and interrogation."
person
to
any
warnings
Miranda
to
give
required
are
authorities
cause
who is subjected to custodial interrogation, the question of when a person is "in custody" and what constitutes "interrogation" are essential inquiries in the Miranda analysis. Further, as the gatekeepers for determining when Miranda warnings are required, the "custody" and
"interrogation" requirements were especially vulnerable to narrow interpretations by those Justices who wished to limit Miranda'sreach.
1. Custody
Given the facts presented, the Miranda Court faced very little difficulty in finding that the four defendants in the cases before it were in cusalso Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 434, 444 (1974) (Blackmun, J., joining Court's
opinion) (describing Miranda safeguards as prophylactic).

96. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-94 (1993). In Withrow, the State, with
the United States as amicus curiae in support, argued that because "Miranda's safeguards
are not constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic,' ... habeas review should not
extend to a claim that a state conviction rests on statements obtained in the absence of
those safeguards." Id. at 690. The Court rejected this argument, stating: "'Prophylactic'
though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right."' Id. at 691 (emphasis removed) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).

97. Cf Grano, ProphylacticRules, supra note 92, at 145-56, 161, 163-64 (taking "prophylactic" characterization seriously and arguing on that basis that Miranda is an illegitimate exercise of judicial authority).
98.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring the warnings when

there is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way").
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tody. At the time of their confessions, three of the defendants had been
arrested, while the fourth had been "picked up" by police; all four had
been taken to a police station for questioning.99 The Court was not,
therefore, faced with having to define the precise boundaries of the custody trigger. Nevertheless, the Court provided several guides that left
little room to doubt that the custody trigger would encompass situations
other than an arrested person at the police station.
First, in its general definition of custody, the Miranda Court explained
that a suspect was "in custody" when he was "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom [by the authorities] in any significant
way." °° On its face, this definition makes reference to neither arrest nor
the police station, and in applying the definition, the Court ruled that the
formality of arrest was not required for the custody trigger to be satisfied.101
Second, in explaining the scope of its ruling, the Miranda Court referred to the warning practices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and to the warning practices prevalent in certain other countries and required
in the United States under the Uniform Code of Military Jus• 102
tice. The Court noted that under these other systems of criminal justice, warnings were typically given or required for "both suspects and
persons under arrest.' 0.3 The Miranda Court intended its warning requirement to be at least as protective as these. ' 04
99. See id. at 491-97 (noting that Miranda, Westover, and Stewart had been arrested,

and that Vignera had been "picked up" by police and was arrested after his questioning).
100. Id. at 444, 478; see also id. at 477 ("The principles announced today deal with the

protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.").
101. See id. at 493-94 (ruling that Vignera was in custody at the time of his initial questioning, even though he was not formally arrested until after his questioning).
102. See id. at 483-90 (referring to FBI practices, and warning requirements in England, Scotland, India, and Ceylon, and under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
103. Id. at 484 (quoting letter from the Solicitor General that warnings are given by

the FBI to suspects and persons under arrest at the outset of the interrogation); id. at 48687 (stating that warnings are required under English law as soon as the police officer "has
evidence that affords reasonable grounds for suspicion"); id. at 488 & n.59 (stating that in
Scotland police interrogation is not permitted beyond "when the stage has been reached at

which suspicion, or more than suspicion, has in their view centred upon some person as
the likely perpetrator of the crime"); id. at 489 (stating that "in our country the Uniform
Code of Military Justice has long provided that no suspect may be interrogated without
first [receiving proper warnings]").
104. See id. at 489 (reasoning that "it is consistent with our legal system that we give at
least as much protection to these rights as [these other jurisdictions]"); see also id. at 486

("The [warning] practice of the FBI can readily be emulated by state and local enforcement agencies.").
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Third, in addition to defining the circumstances where warnings were
required, the Court also gave examples of situations where the warning
requirement was not implicated.' 5 In the course of this discussion, the
Court distinguished between "an individual [who] is in custody on probable cause" and "persons not under restraint," and stated that under the
ruling, the police were free to question the latter.' ° Warnings also were
not required for "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime,"'0 7 or when "a person ... enters a police station and
states that he wishes to confess to a crime."'08 But if the individual had
been "deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way,"
the custody trigger was satisfied.'°9
Despite these guidelines and the Court's attempt to provide a reasonably comprehensive definition of the custody trigger, the custody trigger
suffered ambiguity in two areas: (1) whether police-initiated questioning
of a suspect at a police station necessarily satisfied the custody trigger;
and (2) whether the custody analysis extended beyond the police station.
In its early post-Miranda decisions, the Court seemed to assume that
the answer to the first question was yes, and focused on answering the
second question. In these decisions, the Court, while recognizing that
Miranda focused on the types of psychological pressures that may be exerted on an individual isolated in unfamiliar surroundings, broadly interpreted the "in custody" requirement, and found an interrogee to be "in
custody" even in a familiar setting." ° In Mathis v. United States,"' for example, Mathis was interrogated, without receiving Miranda warnings, by
an Internal Revenue Service agent concerning possible criminal tax
fraud, while he was serving a prison sentence on an unrelated state
charge; he ultimately was convicted of criminal tax fraud based, in part,
on statements he made to the agent."' After losing at the appellate level,
Mathis argued to the Supreme Court that his statements were not admissible under Miranda because he was in custody at the time the statements
were made. The Court agreed, rejecting the Government's argument
that the "in custody" requirement was offense specific."3 The Court
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
(1968).
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 477-78.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id. at 478.
See id.
See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
391 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id. at 2-3.
See id. at 4. The Government argued that because Mathis had not been put into
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stated that the Government's view of custody would "go[] against the
whole purpose of the Miranda decision which was designed to give
meaningful protection to Fifth Amendment rights... 4 Even though
he was nevertheless
Mathis was familiar with his jailhouse11 surroundings,
5
"in custody" for purposes of Miranda.
The following term, the Court again interpreted broadly the "in custody" requirement in Orozco v. Texas."6 In this case, Orozco was questioned at four a.m. in his bedroom about a murder that had occurred
The key issue in the case was whether Orozco
earlier in the evening.'
could be said to be "in custody" while he was questioned in the familiar
surroundings of his bedroom. The Court answered this question affirmatively, noting that Orozco was under arrest and not free to leave when he
was questioned. " '
jail by the officials who interrogated him, he was not entitled to receive Miranda warnings
prior to questioning. See id. In so arguing, the Government favored a narrow view of custody that would focus on why the person was confined. See id. The Court, however, concluded that "[t]hese differences are too minor and shadowy to justify a departure from the
well-considered conclusions of Miranda with reference to warnings to be given to a person
held in custody." Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 4-5. The dissent argued that Mathis was not in custody because of his
familiarity with his surroundings, in contrast with the concerns that motivated the adoption of Miranda: the "pressure to answer questions... [that] flows from ... police station
interrogation of someone charged with or suspected of a crime." Id. at 7 (White, J., dissenting).
116. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
117. See id. at 325. Orozco was questioned by four officers who gained admission to
his boardinghouse by an "unidentified woman" who told them that Orozco was asleep in
the bedroom. See id. The four officers entered Orozco's bedroom and, without apprising
Orozco of the Miranda warnings, asked him questions regarding the following facts: his
name, whether he had been to the cafe where the murder had occurred earlier that evening, whether he owned a pistol, and where the pistol was located. See id. Orozco gave incriminating responses to the officers' questions, which he later sought to have suppressed
on the grounds that he was subjected to custodial interrogation in his bedroom without the
benefit of Miranda warnings. See id. at 325-26.
118. See id. at 327. Central to the Court's holding was the fact that one of the officers
testified that from the moment Orozco identified himself, Orozco "was under arrest and
not free to leave." Id. It is unclear whether the officer related this fact to Orozco during
questioning, however. These facts highlight the uncertainty that existed in the early years
after Miranda concerning the standard to be used in determining custody: the subjective
intentions of the officer to take the individual into custody; the subjective belief of the interrogee that he is in custody; or an objective analysis-whether a reasonable person in
the interrogee's position would conclude that he is in custody. The Court addressed this
confusion in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), and concluded that custody is an
objective inquiry in which a court should consider "how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation." Id. at 442. The Court recently reiterated
this view in Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (noting that the custody determination "depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the sub-
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Although they interpreted broadly the circumstances under which
Miranda warnings were required, Mathis and Orozco also illustrate the
principal internal disagreement on the Court in the early years after
Miranda. The majority focused on whether the circumstances of the
questioning exerted upon the individual a practical compulsion to speak,
regardless of where the interrogation took place. "9 The dissent, on the
other hand, concentrated on the location of the interrogation, focusing
specifically on the fact that the interrogation did not take place at the station house, in concluding that the interrogee was not in custody.120 Even
assuming that Miranda had been correctly decided, the dissent saw
Miranda, at most, as a remedy to dispel the supposedly intimidating atmosphere of the police station, and argued that the majority's opinion
expanded the circumstances under which Miranda warnings would be
required beyond any plausible justification.1 2' Both the majority and dissent seemed to take for granted that the custody trigger would be implicated by any police-initiated station house interrogation, leaving how far
beyond the station house the custody analysis would extend as the principal dispute.
With the appointments of Chief Justice Burger in 1969, Justice Blackmun in 1970, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1971, the politics of
the Court shifted considerably, and shortly thereafter, the Court began to
reorient the "in custody" analysis. In doing so, the Court moved away
jective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the [interrogee]").
119. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's opinions in
its early post-Mirandadecisions).
120. See Orozco, 394 U.S. at 329-30 (White, J., dissenting); see also Mathis, 391 U.S. at
7 (White, J., dissenting). Three Justices dissented in Mathis on the grounds that the
Miranda decision was not supported by the history or language of the Fifth Amendment,
and because they perceived Miranda's cost to society as unreasonably high. See Mathis,
391 U.S. at 5 (White, J., dissenting). These Justices went on to observe that even if
Miranda had been correctly decided, the Mathis majority erred in applying Miranda to
interrogation outside the station house. See id. at 7-8 (noting that "[t]he rationale of
Miranda has no relevance to inquiries conducted outside the allegedly hostile and forbidding atmosphere surrounding police station interrogation"). In Orozco, two dissenting
Justices again critized Miranda, and went on to protest its application outside the police
station. See Orozco, 394 U.S. at 329 (White, J., dissenting) ("If there is any warrant to
Miranda at all, it rests on the likelihood that in a sufficient number of cases exposure to
station house practices will result in compelled confessions and that additional safeguards
should be imposed in all cases to prevent possible erosion of Fifth Amendment values.").
121. See, e.g., Orozco, 394 U.S. at 329-30 (White, J., dissenting). The Orozco dissent,
for example, viewed the majority's position as a significant departure from Miranda because none of the concerns that moved the Miranda majority were present during
Orozco's interrogation: Orozco was interrogated for a short period of time (only four
questions were asked), Orozco's surroundings were familiar, and the police avoided the
psychologically coercive tactics discussed in Miranda. See id. at 330 (arguing that the majority's holding represents "dilution of the custody requirements of Miranda").
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from both the majority and dissenting views of the early post-Miranda
decisions, and began to emphasize the formality of arrest as the determinative "in custody" issue. 12 2 As arrest or arrest-like circumstances became the central consideration, the question was no longer how far beyond the station house the custody analysis would apply, but whether it
would apply even at the station house. 23
The Burger Court began this reorientation by substantially restricting
application of the custody trigger beyond the station house in its first24
case dealing with the "in custody" issue, Beckwith v. United States.
Prior to Beckwith, a number of courts had extended the custody analysis
beyond the station house in those instances where the police were interrogating an individual that they had reasonable grounds to believe may
have125committed the crime or on whom the investigation had come to focus.
Courts derived this focus factor from language in Escobedo that
identified whether an "investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect," as a consideration relevant to determining the time at which the Sixth Amendment's right to assistance of counsel attached.26 Miranda had seemingly

122. See infra notes 124-52 (discussing the change in determination of what constitutes
"in custody").
123. Cf. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990) ("The bare fact of custody may not
in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to
an official, but we do not have occasion to explore that issue here.").
124. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
125. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1.968) (finding custodial interrogation where "[t]he focus of the investigation was clearly and unmistakably
upon [the defendant]," even though police informed defendant that "he was not under
arrest before" the interrogation); People v. Glover, 276 N.Y.S.2d 461, 466-67 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966) ("Moreover, whatever else Miranda may have intended 'custody' to mean, this
much is apparent-police questioning of a person wherever detained, upon whom suspicion has already focused, appears ruled to be 'custodial interrogation[.][].'); Commonwealth v. Sites, 235 A.2d 387, 390-91 (Pa. 1967) (finding custodial interrogation where defendant was questioned by police in his own home at time when "he was strongly
suspected of participation in the crime"). Such a suspect was said to be the "focus" of the
investigation. See Windsor, 389 F.2d at 534.
126. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). The Escobedo Court explained
as follows:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the
suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer,
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment .. "
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incorporated this aspect of Escobedo into its definition of "custodial interrogation" through its footnote four.
Immediately after Miranda,
courts recognized this connection and generally required Miranda warnings• 128
when the individual being questioned was the focus of an investigation, but not where the police were merely seeking129 information from
the individual or conducting on-the-scene questioning.
In Beckwith, the Court rejected the focus argument. Beckwith was a
suspect in a criminal tax fraud investigation, and was interviewed by
agents of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service at a
private home where Beckwith sometimes stayed.130 Beckwith argued that

... We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confessionour adversary system begins to operate ....
Id. at 490-91, 492 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)).
127. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 & n.4 (1966) ("This [custodial interrogation] is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused.").
128. See, e.g., Windsor, 389 F.2d at 534; Sites, 235 A.2d at 389-91; Glover, 276 N.Y.S.2d
at 467-68. One commentator has stated:
The prime inquiry is into the existence of probable cause. If indeed the police officer had probable cause to arrest, his protestations that the person detained was
"free to go" must be ignored. It must be presumed that a police officer will do
his duty; if he has probable cause, he will arrest. The existence of probable cause
establishes "custody." Any other rule would permit the frustration of Miranda's
commands.
SOBEL, supra note 31, at 61.
129. See, e.g., Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding
defendant's statements admissible when made at a time that "the investigation was exploratory and not at the 'accusatory state"'); People v. Merchant, 67 Cal. Rptr. 459, 461-63
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (ruling that police questioning did not require Miranda warnings
where "[tlhe commission of any crime was as yet unknown" and "[t]he interest of the police in the suspect was purely exploratory"); State v. Phinis, 430 P.2d 251, 256 (Kan. 1967)
(finding statements made in response to police questioning admissible because the questioning was a "general inquiry ... for the purpose of determining if a crime had been
committed" and "the inquiry into such had not focused on any particular suspect"), disapproved on other grounds, 433 P.2d 538 (Kan. 1967); State v. Tarrance, 211 So. 2d 304, 30809 (La. 1968) ("[I]t was required that appellant be advised of his constitutional rights at
the time the investigation of Mrs. Millien's death ceased to be exploratory in nature, i.e.,
when the officers focused their attention on appellant as the guilty party .... and sought
to secure inculpatory statements from him."); see also SOBEL, supra note 31, at 62 (noting
that "interrogation may be found 'non-custodial' only when it is perfectly evident that the
police were clearly investigating to determine whether a crime had been committed or
who had committed it," and stating that "[t]he basic inquiry is 'Were the police merely
seeking information from the person detained or had suspicion sufficiently focused to establish an intent to detain?"').
130. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 342 (1976). The agents identified
themselves to the person who answered the door, and were invited into the house. See id.
While the agents were inside the house, Beckwith was permitted to move about unhin-
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his statements during the interview and any evidence derived from those
statements should be suppressed because he was the "focus" of a criminal investigation at the time he was questioned, and had not received the
warnings required by Miranda.t3 ' The Court refused to suppress Beckwith's statements, finding that while Beckwith may have been the "focus" of a criminal investigation, he was not in custody for purposes of
Miranda; therefore, the agents were not required to provide him with
Mirandawarnings prior to questioning. 32
In several respects, Beckwith was an easy case for the Court to decide
because Beckwith received partial Miranda warnings, and was interviewed in a "relaxed" and "friendly" atmosphere at his friend's home.
The coercion that exists when a person is questioned alone in an unfamiliar environment, some of the concerns that motivated the Miranda
Court, simply were not present in Beckwith. This aspect of Beckwith is
perfectly consistent with the cases interpreting Miranda up to that time.3
By rejecting the "focus" argument, however, Beckwith departs significantly from the earlier decisions. After Beckwith, police were no longer
required to give Mirandawarnings to an individual that they suspected of
committing the crime, thereby permitting police to engage in accusatory
questioning of the suspect, at least where the interrogation took place
dered. See id. at 343. The agents gave Beckwith incomplete Miranda warnings, which
Beckwith waived, and then interviewed Beckwith for about three hours in a "relaxed" and
"friendly" atmosphere. See id. The agents asked to examine certain of Beckwith's records, which Beckwith indicated were at his place of employment. See id. at 343-44. The
agents warned Beckwith that he was not required to furnish the records to the agents, but
Beckwith nevertheless agreed to provide the records. See id. at 344. At the conclusion of
the interview, the agents permitted Beckwith to drive his own vehicle to his place of employment, where the agents met him in order to retrieve the records. See id.
131. See id. at 344.
132. See id. at 344, 346-47. The Court recently reiterated its rejection of the focus argument in Stansbury v. California,511 U.S. 318 (1994), holding that an officer's subjective
and undisclosed view that the interrogee is a suspect is irrelevant to the custody analysis.
See id. at 323-24. The Court went on to note that the officer's beliefs or knowledge, when
conveyed to the suspect by word or deed, were relevant to the custody issue "only to the
extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the [interrogee's] position" would
view his "freedom of action." Id. at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (describing the facts in Beckwith).
134. In many of the pre-Beckwith cases, courts had found that interrogation in familiar
surroundings, such as the person's home or the home of a familiar third person, was an
important factor in concluding that the person was not in custody at the time of questioning. See, e.g., Truex v. State, 210 So. 2d 424, 425 (Ala. 1968) (finding that defendant was
not in custody when, among other factors, he was questioned in his home); Phinis, 430
P.2d at 253, 256 (finding that defendant was not in custody when, among other factors, she
was questioned in a cabin that she occupied); Tarrance, 211 So. 2d at 306, 309 (finding that
defendant was not in custody when, among other factors, he was questioned at home of an
"intimate friend" who he planned to marry).
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outside the station house. 35 In so ruling, Beckwith significantly narrowed
the circumstances under which Miranda warnings would be required outside the station house.
Having limited the application of Miranda outside the station house,
the Court began in succeeding years to limit the application of Miranda
in cases involving interrogations within the station house. This trend be-

gan in the year following Beckwith, in Oregon v. Mathiason,'36 where the
Court considered whether station house interrogation of an individual
who had become the "focus" of an investigation must be preceded by
Miranda warnings.

The Oregon Supreme Court had determined that

Mathiason was in custody at the time the interrogation occurred, and had
The Court
ruled that Miranda warnings were, therefore, required.
summarily reversed; it was not persuaded that Mathiason was "in cus-

tody" simply because his interrogation had taken place at the police station, nor was it persuaded that Mathiason was "in custody" because he
had become the focus of the investigation.'

Instead, the Court analyzed

135. While accusatory questioning would likely not represent a due process violation,
the Miranda Court observed that it is a police interrogation tactic that contributes to the
police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were meant to dispel. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966) ("The guilt of the suspect is to be posited as a fact.").
Notwithstanding the Miranda Court's observation, the Court has recently held that accusatory questioning at the station house may not render an individual in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 ("Even a clear statement from an officer
that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the
custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an
arrest.").
136. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
137. See id. at 493-94. In this case, Mathiason, a parolee, was a suspect in a residential
burglary. See id. at 493. After several attempts to reach Mathiason at his apartment, the
police officer left his card at the apartment with a note asking Mathiason to call in order to
"discuss something." Id. When Mathiason called, the officer asked where it would be
convenient to meet; when Mathiason expressed no preferences, the officer arranged to
meet Mathiason at the police station. See id.
When Mathiason arrived at the police station, the officer shook hands with him and told
Mathiason he was not under arrest. See id. The officer led Mathiason to a room for questioning, and closed the door. See id. The officer told Mathiason that he was a suspect in a
burglary, and stated falsely that Mathiason's fingerprints had been recovered from the
burglary scene. See id. The officer also stated that Mathiason's "truthfulness would possibly be considered by the district attorney or judge." Id. Within five minutes of Mathiason's arrival at the station house, he gave a confession. See id. The officer then apprised
Mathiason of his Mirandarights, and took a taped-recorded confession. See id. at 494. At
the end of the interview, Mathiason was told he was free to leave and that he was not being arrested at that time. See id.
138. See id. at 492, 494.
139. See id. at 495. As the Court explained: "Nor is the requirement of warnings to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect." Id.
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the custody issue exclusively in terms of whether Mathiason had been
under arrest or suffered a restraint on his freedom of movement at the
time the interrogation occurred."' Under this interpretation of the custody trigger, the critical facts were that Mathiason (1) "came voluntarily
to the police station;" (2) "was immediately informed that he was not
under arrest;" and (3) was allowed to leave the station house at the end
of the interview.1 4 ' Therefore, it was simply irrelevant that Mathiason
had come to the police station in response to a police request, was interviewed by a police officer in isolation, was falsely informed that the police had evidence incriminating him in the crime, and was a parolee under supervision.'42
These factors may establish that Mathiason's
interrogation took place in a "coercive environment," but according to
the Court, they had "nothing to do with43 whether respondent was in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule.'
The Court continued on this path and further narrowed the "in custody" analysis in California v. Beheler 44 In this case, Beheler and several others attempted to steal illegal drugs from a drug dealer. When the
drug dealer resisted, Beheler's companion shot and killed her. Shortly
thereafter, Beheler called the police to report the crime and to advise45
them that the murder weapon had been hidden in Beheler's backyard.
Beheler consented to a search of his backyard, and the police recovered
the weapon. Beheler later agreed to accompany the police to 46the station,
although he was specifically told that he was not under arrest.1
At the station, Beheler agreed to discuss the murder, although he was
not apprised of his Mirandarights.4 4 The interview lasted less than thirty
minutes, and after the interview, Beheler was permitted to leave the station. Five days later, Beheler was arrested in connection with the murder. After the arrest, Beheler was advised of his Miranda rights, which
he waived, and gave a second tape-recorded confession in which he

140. See id. at 495. The Mathiason Court explained its refusal to consider the possible
coercive effects of the police station environment through the following observation: "Any
interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it,
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system
which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime." Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 493, 495.
143. See id. at 495-96.
144. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
145. See id. at 1122.
146. See id.

147. See id.
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14 8
stated that his earlier statement to the police had been voluntary.
Although these facts bear some similarity to those in Mathiason, there
are several key differences. First, in Mathiason, the defendant had come
to the police station under his own power in response to a note left on his
door.1 49 In contrast, the police in Beheler were physically present when
they asked Beheler to accompany them to the police station, and Beheler
was apparently taken to the station house by the police. Second, at the
time of the "request" that Beheler "accompany" them to the station, the
police in Beheler had probable cause to arrest Beheler for his participation in the crime under investigation. If Beheler had refused to "come
along," the police could simply have forced him, and Beheler was almost
certainly aware of that reality when he "agreed" to accompany them.
For these and other reasons, the California Court of Appeal had distinguished Mathiason, ruling that, because Beheler was in custody at the
time his first statement was made, he was entitled to Miranda warnings;
his failure to receive them necessitated reversal of his conviction.1 50 On
certiorari, the Court was not persuaded that the case was materially different than Mathiason and summarily reversed."' In doing so, the Court

148. See id.
149. See supra note 137 (discussing the facts in Mathiason).
150. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122-23. Among other factors, the California appellate
court focused on the fact that Beheler was questioned at the police station. See id. at 1123.
It distinguished Mathiason on the grounds that "Beheler was interviewed shortly after the
crime was committed, had been drinking... and was emotionally distraught" at the time
of the interrogation. Id. at 1124-25. The court also noted that the police had substantially
more information about Beheler at the time of questioning than did the police in Mathiason, and that because Mathiason was a parolee, he was obligated to cooperate with the
police. See id. at 1125.
The fact that Mathiason was a parolee actually cuts both ways on the custody issue. See
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 500 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens
observed, the State on the one hand has greater authority to question a parolee about his
activities than to question the average citizen. See id. On the other hand, however, a parolee is technically in custody until his sentence has been served, so under a formalistic
analysis of the custody issue, the parolee should always receive Mirandawarnings prior to
questioning. See id. Justice Stevens observed that:
Miranda teaches that even if a suspect is not in custody, warnings are necessary if
he is "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." If a
parolee being questioned in a police station is not described by that language, today's decision qualifies that part of Miranda to some extent.
Id.
Due to the Court's summary disposition of Mathiason, the impact, if any, of Mathiason's
status as a parolee on the custody issue was left unresolved. Cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465
U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (finding that probationer was not "in custody" during meeting with
his probation officer despite the terms of probation which required!him to report to his
probation officer periodically and to be truthful with the officer "in all matters").
151. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1121-22.
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introduced a custody standard that rigidly construed the custody question. The Beheler Court concluded that although it was proper for a
court to consider the circumstances of each case, "the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint 1on
5 2 freedom of
movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.
The effect of the Court's decisions in Beckwith, Mathiason, and Beheler is to narrow significantly the Miranda concept of custody.'53 After
Beheler, a person will be said to be "in custody" only if the person has
been formally arrested, or the situation has come to resemble a formal
arrest. This definition amounts to a redundancy: Miranda's reference to
"custody" now means "formal arrest," while Miranda's discussion of
"otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way' ' 15 4
now means circumstances that look like a formal arrest.'55 After Beckwith, police may question without Miranda warnings, even in an accusatory manner, the prime suspect in an investigation, and based upon
Mathiason, may trick the suspect by presenting him with false evidence
of his guilt in hopes of eliciting incriminating statements.'
Moreover,
the interrogation may take place at the station house, so long as the suspect is told he is not under arrest and may leave at anytime.'57
152. Id. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495). The Court cited Mathiason for
the proposition that custody means 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement"'
to a degree associated with formal arrest. See id. However, when this language is examined in the context of the Mathiason decision, the Mathiason Court is merely explaining
that a "coercive environment" is not enough to satisfy Miranda's custody requirement.
See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 ("Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in
which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took
place in a 'coercive environment."'). In extending this explanation, the Mathiason Court
was not attempting to limit the definition of "in custody" to formal arrest or situations that
resemble formal arrest.
153. Miranda defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
154. Id.
155. See Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. Whether Beheler's reference to "freedom of
movement" in contrast with Miranda'sdiscussion of "freedom of action" will place an additional restrictive limitation on the "in custody" question remains to be seen.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 135 and 142.
157. While it was significant to the Mathiason and Beheler Courts that the suspects in
both cases had been told they were free to leave the station and were not arrested at the
conclusion of questioning, this does not appear to be an absolute prerequisite to a finding
that the suspect was not in custody. In Stansbury v. California,511 U.S. 318, 320, 326-27
(1994), the Court reversed a state court's holding that Stansbury was "in custody" when he
was questioned at a police station in connection with a homicide to which he was a possible witness. Stansbury agreed to the interview and rode to the police station in the front
seat of the police car. See id. at 320. It does not appear that Stansbury was ever told that
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By limiting custody to arrest and arrest-like situations, the Court has
narrowed substantially the circumstances under which Miranda warnings
will be required. If an individual is not in custody simply because police
informed him that he may terminate the interrogation and leave the station house, we can be assured that police will be trained to make this recital."' However, the fact that such a recital has been murmured has no
true bearing on how an individual undergoing station house interrogation perceives his status. Few individuals, even the hypothetical "reasonable person," would likely believe that they were free to end an interrogation and leave if they were confronted with false "evidence" or
accused of committing a crime. 9 The compulsion to speak under such
he was free to leave, however, and he was arrested after giving incriminating statements
during the interview. See id. at 320-21. Further, the fact that during the course of the interview the officer became suspicious that Stansbury was the perpetrator of the crime did
not, by itself, render Stansbury in custody. See id. at 324. So long as the officer's views
that the suspect is no longer free to leave remain undisclosed to the suspect, the suspect is
not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See id. at 324-25 (permitting police actually to accuse the interrogee of the crime: "Even a clear statement from an officer that the person
under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for
some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest.").
In addition to whether the police officer advises the suspect that he is free to leave, several courts have incorporated into the totality of the circumstances analysis the consideration of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation
and leave. See, e.g., United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir. 1998) (considering
that courts, in determining whether suspect is "in custody," may inquire into whether a
reasonable person in that suspect's particular circumstances would have felt free to leave).
This "free to leave" component of the custody question finds support in the Court's recent
Thompson v. Keohane decision, in which the Court noted that the "in custody" analysis
turned on whether "given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." 516 U.S. 99, 112-13 (1995)
(footnote omitted) (making the above observation in a case which held that the "in custody" issue is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review by a
federal habeas court). While the "free to leave" inquiry should, at most, represent only
one factor in the "in custody" analysis, it seems likely that this will become the dispositive
consideration in non-Terry cases, as it is a question that can be easily addressed by courts
with a minimum expenditure of judicial resources. The danger, however, is that it is also a
question that is susceptible to results-oriented decisionmaking by the courts.
158. Police are also well aware of the importance of fostering a congenial atmosphere
by providing bathroom breaks, soft drinks, and permitting smoking. These police efforts
would be intended to address the question of whether a reasonable person would feel free
to terminate the interrogation and leave. See Keohane, 516 U.S. at 112 (noting that the
existence of custody turns on whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave).
159. Courts have not always accepted the self-serving statements of police officers as
being indicative of what a person might reasonably believe. See Windsor v. United States,
389 F.2d 530, 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1968) (concluding that Windsor had been in custody when
interrogated in his motel room despite FBI agent's statement to Windsor that "he was not
under arrest and was not being detained in any way and was not to construe this [the interrogation] as being detained," because the agents had probable cause to arrest Windsor at
the time of the interrogation; "[t]he Government agents' testimony that Windsor was not a
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circumstances in an attempt to clear oneself would presumably be overwhelming. These are the precise concerns that motivated the Miranda
Court: reducing the practical compulsion to speak that arises in a policedominated atmosphere where the suspect has not been fully apprised of
his federal constitutional rights.
Through the tactics used to avoid an "in custody" finding and, thereby,
avoid Miranda requirements, the police may actually be creating an environment that is at least as psychologically compelling as what typically
existed at the time Miranda was decided. Police may isolate the individual and question him at the police station. Police may use sympathy, display antagonism toward the victim, and appear to be on the suspect's
side as if looking for a way to exclude him from suspicion,' 6° all without
apprising the suspect that, in fact, the officer is his adversary or potential
adversary. Since the average member of the public has largely come to
believe that he is not in any irredeemable trouble with the law until given
the Miranda warnings, 161 the Court's interpretation of the "in custody"
trigger enables police to capitalize on this misconception and encourage
the suspect to "explain himself" into a conviction.
In addition to the doctrinal narrowing of the custody trigger, lower
courts cannot help but to have noticed the shifting direction in the
Court's approach to Miranda custody issues. Where, in the first years after Miranda, the Court consistently reversed appellate decisions for defining custody too narrowly, the Court since the mid-1970s has almost
suspect and not under arrest when questioned in his motel room is belied by the facts of
the case. We cannot permit the Miranda principles to be so easily frustrated.").
160. See INBAU & REID, supra note 57, at ix (listing various interrogation techniques,
with titles such as "Sympathize with the Subject by Telling Him That Anyone Else
[U]nder Similar Conditions or Circumstances Might Have Done the Same Thing," "Reduce the Subject's Guilt Feeling by Minimizing the Moral Seriousness of his Offense,"
"Suggest a Less Revolting and More Morally Acceptable Motivation or Reason for the
Offense Than That Which Is Known or Presumed," "Sympathize with the Subject by (1)
Condemning His Victim, (2) Condemning His Accomplice, or (3) Condemning Anyone
Else [u]pon Whom Some Degree of Moral Responsibility Might Conceivably Be Placed
for the Commission of the Crime in Question," and "Utilize Displays of Understanding
and Sympathy in Urging the Subject to Tell the Truth").
161. Cf, e.g., Adedeji v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 688, 700 (D. Mass. 1992) (describing, in a border search context, that the customs inspectors read the suspect her
Miranda warnings, "giving her the impression that she was about to be arrested").
162. Even an innocent person may lie to avoid disclosing personal information or an
embarrassing fact in what otherwise seems to be a cordial discussion, not realizing that the
lie may be used at a later criminal prosecution to help prove his guilt. See, e.g., Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433, 447 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The innocent as well as the
guilty may be caught in a web of circumstantial evidence that is difficult to break. A man
may be guilty of indiscretions but not of the crime. He may be implicated by ambiguous
circumstances difficult to explain away."), overruled in parton other grounds by Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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universally taken the opposite stance, consistently reversing appellate
Supreme Court decisions
decisions for defining custody too broadly.
but also a sense of the
rules,
doctrinal
invariably provide not only specific
16
direction in which the Court desires to move. 4 Attuned to these subtextual signals, lower courts have embraced the Court's new direction, and
have narrowed the custody analysis even further than required by the
specific holdings in Beckwith, Beheler, and Mathiason"'
163. Compare Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 326-27 (reversing state supreme court decision
for defining custody too broadly), California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125-26 (1983) (per
curiam) (summarily reversing appellate court decision for defining custody too broadly),
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1977) (per curiam) (same), and Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976) (affirming appellate court decision that defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda at time of questioning simply because he
was the "focus" of the investigation), with Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969)
(reversing appellate court decision for defining custody too narrowly), and Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968) (same).
164. For example, despite holding in Mathis that a person serving a prison sentence for
one crime was "in custody" when he was interrogated by government officials about another, unrelated crime, the Rehnquist Court in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990),
purported to leave open the question of whether "[t]he bare fact of custody [would] in
every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an
official." Id. at 299-300 (ruling that Perkins was not entitled to Miranda warnings because
he was not "interrogated" during his incarceration when Perkins was questioned about an
unrelated murder by an undercover agent and was, therefore, unaware that he was
speaking to a government official); see also Laurie Magid, Questioningthe Question-Proof
Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for IncarceratedSuspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 932-51
(1997) (arguing that incarcerated suspects should not be considered "in custody" for
Miranda purposes absent some additional restraint).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting
that even "drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol car for
questioning, or using or threatening to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful [traffic] stop into a custodial arrest for Mirandapurposes"); United States v. Howard, 991 F.2d
195, 200 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that defendant was not in custody even though police officers had told him to "stay put" during a search of his residence). For example, in State v.
Bradley, 538 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1989), the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed without discussion the lower court's holding that the defendant was not in custody when he was a prisoner interrogated about a murder that had occurred in the prison. See id. at 375-76, 385.
The Ohio courts concluded that Bradley was not entitled to receive Miranda warnings
prior to this interrogation because he was not "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. See
Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1101, 1103 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
In so holding, the Ohio courts followed a trend that had developed in several other courts
in which a prison inmate would be considered "in custody" for Miranda purposes only if
some additional restriction on his freedom of movement above and beyond the normal
limitations of incarceration had been imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 800 F.2d
412, 414 (4th Cir. 1986); Flittie v. Solem, 751 F.2d 967, 974 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Scalf, 725 F.2d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1984); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427-29 (9th
Cir. 1978); see also Magid, supra note 164, at 935-39 (summarizing decisions imposing additional restraint requirement). Despite the fact that this "additional restraint" test appeared to be directly contrary to the Court's holding in Mathis, see 391 U.S. at 4-5 (holding
that a person serving a prison sentence for one crime was "in custody" when he was inter-
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While this article focuses on whether the Court's unduly-narrow interpretation of Miranda is an appropriate way to revise constitutional doctrine, rather than on the legitimacy of the policies and assumptions that
motivate the Court's interpretations, it seems clear that certain of the
Court's membership view the costs of Miranda,as Miranda was intended
to function, as simply being too high.'6 Regardless, as the Court chips
away at Miranda, perhaps in an effort to redress these perceived problems, the Court may, in fact, be chipping away at its own institutional legitimacy.
2. Interrogation
Although the Miranda Court did not provide a great deal of guidance
on what specific police actions "interrogation" would cover, it referred to67
interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers.',
The Miranda Court was not asked to provide additional context because
in each of the four cases presented the defendants had been directly
questioned by law enforcement officers, leaving open the issue of
whether police practices that did not amount to express questioning
might constitute "interrogation." 16The
Court was called upon to address
9
Innis.
v.
Island
Rhode
in
issue
this
rogated about another, unrelated crime), the Court denied Bradley's petition for certiorari. See Bradley, 497 U.S. at 1011.
166. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 704 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Any rule that so demonstrably renders truth and society the
loser, bear[s] a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring official lawlessness.") (internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 257-58 (1983) (White,
J., concurring in judgment)); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 662-63 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("To be sure, the Court has been
sensitive to the substantial burden the Miranda rules place on local law enforcement efforts, and consequently has refused to extend the decision or to increase its strictures on
law enforcement agencies in almost any way.").
167. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
168. See id., 384 U.S. at 491 (noting that Miranda was taken by police to "'Interrogation Room No. 2 "' where "he was questioned by two police officers"); id. at 493 (noting
that Vignera was taken to a police station and was there "questioned" by a detective); id.
at 494-95 (noting that Westover was interrogated by local police and then by the FBI); id.
at 497 (noting that after taking Stewart into custody, "police interrogated [him] on nine
different occasions" over a five day period).
169. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In this case, Innis was arrested in connection with the shotgun murder of a taxicab driver and the armed robbery of a second taxicab driver. See id.
at 293-94. At the time of his arrest, he was advised of his Miranda rights. See id. at 294.
Innis stated that he understood his rights and invoked his right to counsel, whereupon the
police loaded Innis into a squad car for transport to the central police station. See id.
Three officers accompanied Innis and were cautioned by the Captain not to "question ...
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In Innis, the parties were in agreement that Innis was "in custody," and
that Innis had validly invoked his right to counsel. The issue, therefore,
was whether the police officers had "interrogated" Innis in violation of
Miranda when they discussed among themselves their concerns about a
handicapped child perhaps finding the missing shotgun and hurting herself.
In considering the meaning of "interrogation," the Innis Court observed that Miranda's discussion of this term might suggest that the interrogation trigger was satisfied only by express questioning of an individual who is in police custody.17 The Court concluded that Miranda
should not be read so narrowly, however.17"' The Innis Court based its interpretation of "interrogation" on the fact that several of the police practices the Miranda Court identified did not involve "express questioning,"'12 and concluded that "these techniques of persuasion, no less than
express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to

intimidate or coerce Innis in any way." Id. During the trip to the central station, one of
the officers initiated a conversation with one of the other officers concerning the missing
shotgun. See id. This officer later testified regarding the conversation:
"A. At this point, I was talking back and forth with [one of the other officers in
the vehicle] stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a
school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there's a lot of handicapped
children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a
weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves."
Id. at 294-95 (alteration in original).
Innis interrupted, telling the officers they should turn the vehicle around so that he
could show them where the shotgun was hidden. See id. at 295. The officers did so, and
upon return to the crime scene, Innis pointed out the gun's location. See id. Innis stated
that he "'wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the
school."' Id. Innis later sought to suppress the shotgun and the statements he made to the
police about its location. See id. at 295-96. The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded
that once Innis had invoked his right to counsel, Miranda required that all interrogation
cease, and that the officers in the vehicle had "interrogated" Innis without a valid waiver
of his Miranda rights. Id. at 296. Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Innis had validly waived
his Miranda rights. See id. The Court granted certiorari to consider "for the first time the
meaning of 'interrogation' under Miranda v. Arizona." Id. at 297.
170. See id. at 298.
171. Seeid. at 299.
172. See id. The practices noted by the Innis Court included "the use of lineups in
which a coached witness would pick the defendant as the perpetrator"; the use of a "'reverse line-up"' in which a coached witness would identify the defendant as the perpetrator
of a fictitious crime, in hopes that the defendant would confess to the actual crime for
which he was a suspect in order to avoid prosecution for the false crime; and various "psychological ploys," including assuming the guilt of the suspect, minimizing the seriousness
of the crime, and blaming the victim and society for causing the suspect to commit the
crime. Id.
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interrogation. ,171
The Court emphasized that Miranda warnings were not required simply because an individual had been taken into police custody; Miranda
applied where a person in custody was subjected to interrogation, and
was accordingly exposed to "a measure of compulsion above and beyond
that inherent in custody itself.', 17 4 The Court defined "interrogation" to
mean not only express questioning, but also its "functional equivalent,"
and went on to explain that this meant "any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat'
ing response from the suspect."175
By incorporating the "functional equivalent" of interrogation in its
definition, the Innis Court focused on the suspect's perceptions, rather
than on the intentions of the law enforcement officer. Therefore, a practice that an officer should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response amounts to interrogation, even without objective proof
of the officer's intent to obtain an incriminating response."' The Innis
Court's determination that "interrogation" may occur in situations other
than direct police questioning represents an appropriate reading of
Miranda, and the standard that it introduced for determining whether
police conduct amounts to interrogation is equally consistent with the
concerns that prompted the Miranda Court."' Although Innis's definition
of interrogation is perfectly rational in light of Miranda, the Court's ap-

173. Id. The Innis Court observed that "[t]o limit the ambit of Miranda to express
questioning would 'place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of
indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda."' Id. at
299 n.3 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 285 A.2d 172,175 (Pa. 1971)).
174. Id. at 300.
175. Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
176. See id. at 301. In a footnote, the Court explained that the officer's intent remained relevant, however, in that use of a police practice that is designed or intended to
elicit an incriminating response is likely a practice that that the police should have known
was reasonably likely to evoke such a response. See id. at 301 n.7. Nevertheless, the Court
insisted that police officers cannot be held responsible for the "unforeseeable results of
their words or actions." Id. at 301-02. In judging whether a response was "unforeseeable," the Court observed that any knowledge that the officer might have concerning a
suspect's susceptibility to a certain type of persuasive practice would be important in determining whether the officer should have known that his words or conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from that suspect. See id. at 302 n.8.
177. The Innis Court, like the Miranda Court, was concerned that creation of an "interrogation environment" during custodial interrogation would "'subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination." Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58
(1966)).
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plication of this test to the Innis facts reflects an analysis that is unreasonable in view of Miranda'sgoals.
The Innis Court first concluded that Innis was not subjected to interrogation because the officers' conversation in the police car did not include
"express questioning" of Innis. 78 The Court next determined that Innis
was not subjected to the "functional equivalent" of express questioning
because there was nothing in the record to suggest that the officers
should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to cause
Innis to incriminate himself.17 9 Because the officers' entire discussion
amounted to no more than "a few offhand remarks," as contrasted with a
"lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect," the officers would not
reasonably have known that Innis would be moved to incriminate himself.1 O In reaching this conclusion, the Court established an unrealistically high threshold for determining when an officer should have known
that his conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Although there was no direct evidence that the officers' conversation was
intended as, or designed to be, an interrogation tactic, appeals to the
conscience of a suspect are a well-known interrogation strategy. 81 But
the Court was unwilling to presume that the officers were using this
strategy, absent some showing that Innis was "peculiarly susceptible" to
statements concerning the safety of handicapped children.
The Court's analytic approach is problematic for two reasons. First,
application of the Innis standard leads to a swearing contest between
suspect and officers that is even more troubling than the one that arises
on the issue of whether the Miranda warnings have been properly
given. '
The suspect swears that the conduct or statements were intended to pressure him to respond, the officers deny any such purpose,
178.

See id. at 302.

179.

See id. at 302-03. The Court observed that nothing in the record suggested that

the officers were aware that Innis would be especially susceptible to concerns about the
safety of handicapped children or that the officers were aware that Innis "was unusually
disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest." Id. at 302-03. There was also no indication
that the officers' remarks were "designed" to evoke an incriminating response, because it
was "'entirely understandable that [the officers] would voice their concern [for the safety
of the handicapped children] to each other."' Id. at 303 n.9 (quoting state trial judge who
heard the officers' testimony) (emphasis removed) (alteration in original).

180. See id at 303.
181. Police interrogation manuals suggest that the interrogator appeal to the suspect
to confess for the sake of his own conscience, for the sake of all concerned, and to "display
some evidence of decency and honor" by confessing the crime. See, e.g., INBAU & REID,
supra note 57, at 56-58.

182.

See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 870-71, 882 (noting that "Miranda does

nothing whatsoever to mitigate the pitfalls of the swearing contest" between police and

defendant that was a central failing of the voluntariness standard).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 48:727

and the court or jury is left with largely unfettered discretion to resolve
the issue.183 Second, the Court's approach permits the police effectively
to initiate custodial interrogation without providing Miranda warnings or
to interrogate a Mirandized suspect who has invoked his right to counsel,
so long as the police have no reason to believe that the interrogation
strategy might be successful.' 84 It is certainly contrary to Miranda that in
order for a classic interrogation technique to be considered "interrogation," the police must be aware that the suspect might be vulnerable to
such a strategy."" Miranda contemplates that once the suspect invokes
his right to counsel, he will no longer be subjected to interrogation, not
183. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113, 116-17 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding trial judge's acceptance of FBI agents' testimony that they had not questioned
suspect in any way during transport, and rejecting defendant's version of what transpired);
cf Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 447 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
The officer's version frequently may reflect an inaccurate understanding of an
accused's statements or, on occasion, may be deliberately distorted or falsified.
While the accused may protest against these misrepresentations, his protestations
will normally be in vain. This is particularly true when the officer is accompanied
by several of his assistants and they all vouch for his story.
Id. (quoting Justice Black's dissent in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340-41 (1957)). For example, a strategy among police officers to pressure a suspect to speak is to use the silence
treatment. Under this approach, an officer arrests the person or takes him into custody,
but does not read him the Miranda warnings. The officer is careful not to question the
suspect, however, so the interrogation trigger for Miranda is not satisfied. In fact, the officer says absolutely nothing to the suspect while transporting him to the station house or
during the booking process. Without Miranda warnings, many suspects exposed to such
treatment succumb to the uncomfortable silence, and "volunteer" information to the officer in an attempt to extricate themselves from the situation. Cf Carpenter,611 F.2d at 116
(accepting agent's version that defendant's statement came during "some long periods of
silence, at which [the defendant] apparently felt like he had to say something, and he
did"(internal quotations omitted)). Although officers will commonly use the silent treatment in a manner "designed" or intended to have just such an effect on the suspect,
thereby satisfying Innis's definition of "interrogation," they can easily explain away silence
as simply that, not a treatment.
184. Cf. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 ("There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children.").
185. As Justice Powell noted in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987), "[o]fficers do
not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself." Id. at 529.
Although Justice Powell thought this provided a reason to conclude that Mauro had not
been interrogated, he was missing the point of his own words. Officers do not interrogate
a suspect simply by "hoping that he will incriminate himself," but rather they usually have
some definite plan or strategy in mind to lead the suspect to incriminate himself. As a
consequence, when police officers act in a manner that generates a response, the more
plausible assumption is that they acted in that manner to generate the response. Cf
United States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1992) ("While [the officer's] remark was
not couched in formal question and answer form, in substance it was a direct inquiry into
[defendant's] reasons for committing the offense he appeared to have committed, and it
elicited an inculpatory response.").
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that the police may continue
S 186with interrogation tactics so long as they
appear unlikely to be fruitful.
Moreover, even applying the standard in the manner the Court suggests, it is difficult to imagine that the officers' conversation would not be
viewed as calling for a response from a reasonable person-Innis was
faced with the knowledge that if he failed to disclose the location of the
shotgun, an innocent, handicapped little girl might be killed.18 ' The
Court's refusal to credit the power that such an appeal would likely have
turns a reasonable-sounding standard for identifying the presence of interrogation on its head.' 8

While Justice Marshall viewed the result in Innis as an "aberration"
and expressed hope that the interrogation standard would be applied
more reasonably in future cases,189 he was to be disappointed when the
Court next considered the issue in Arizona v. Mauro.19) As in Innis, the

186. As Justice Stevens observed in dissent in Innis:
From the suspect's point of view, the effectiveness of the warnings depends on
whether it appears that the police are scrupulously honoring his rights. Apparent
attempts to elicit information from a suspect after he has invoked his right to cut
off questioning necessarily demean that right and tend to reinstate the imbalance
between police and suspect that the Miranda warnings are designed to correct.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 295. The officer's decision to describe the child as a little girl, rather
than a boy or simply a child, suggests that he intended his statement to have the most significant emotional appeal possible on Innis. Cf. id. (stating that the third officer testified
that he overheard the conversation between the other two officers as follows: "'A. He...
said it would be too bad if the little-I believe he said a girl-would pick up the gun,
maybe kill herself."').
188. See id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall observed, "[t]he notion that such an appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were
known to have some special interest in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous." Id.
189. See id. at 307 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing "I firmly believe that this case is
simply an aberration, and that in future cases the Court will apply the standard adopted
today in accordance with its plain meaning.").
190. 481 U.S. 520 (1987). In this case, Mr. Mauro entered a local store and stated that
he had killed his son. See id. at 521. When the police arrived, Mauro again claimed to
have killed his son, and directed the police to the child's body. See id. He was then arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. See id. at 521-22. At the police station, Mauro
invoked his right to have counsel present, and all questioning ceased. See id. at 522. Because there was no secure detention area available, Mauro was held in the police captain's
office. See id. During this same period of time, Mrs. Mauro was being questioned in another room. See id. She asked the officer, Detective Manson, if she could speak with her
husband. See id. After discussing Mrs. Mauro's request with his supervisor, it was determined that Mrs. Mauro would be permitted to speak with her husband but that the Mauros would not be left alone and that their conversation would be tape-recorded. See id.
Manson informed the Mauros that they could speak to each other only if an officer remained present "to observe and hear what was going on;" then placed a tape-recorder in
plain view on the table and recorded the Mauros's conversation. See id. During the con-
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suspect, Mauro, had been arrested, and after receiving Miranda warnings, had invoked his right to counsel."' Because the crime at issue was
the murder of Mauro's son, the police had also brought Mrs. Mauro to
the police station for questioning. After questioning Mrs. Mauro, the
police allowed her to speak with her husband while an officer was present to record Mr. Mauro's reaction to her statements. Mr. Mauro's responses were later used at trial to rebut his contention that he was insane
at the time of the killing.12 Mauro argued that the confrontation with his
wife was a psychological ploy, and therefore, the "functional equivalent"
of interrogation under Innis, and that the statements he made during this
discussion should have been suppressed. The Arizona Supreme Court
agreed, and reversed Mauro's conviction.'93 The United States Supreme
Court disagreed with this application of Innis, however, and ruled that
allowing Mrs. Mauro to speak with her husband while an officer remained present to record the conversation did not amount to interrogation.' 94
The police clearly foresaw the likelihood that the Mauros' discussion
would lead to incriminating statements-the officer brought a tape recorder along and used it to record the conversation.'9 The police also refused to give Mauro any advance warning that Mrs. Mauro would be
permitted to speak with him, or to wait until after Mauro had an opportunity to consult with counsel and have counsel present before allowing
the confrontation to occur. 1 16 Nevertheless, the Court noted that Mauro
versation, Mrs. Mauro expressed regret that they had not taken their son to the hospital
and despair about their situation. See id. at 522 n.1.
While attempting to get his wife to "[s]hut up" and exercise her right to have counsel
present, Mr. Mauro made the following incriminating statement: "You tried to stop me as
best you can. What are you going to do, kill me?" Id. at 522-23 n.1.
191. See id. at 521-22.
192. See id. at 523.
193. See id. at 524-25.
194. See id. at 529-30.
195. See id. at 534-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, writing for the Court, was
careful to emphasize that the police were simply acceding to Mrs. Mauro's "demands" to
see her husband. See id. at 528 (quoting trial court's finding that police had finally
"'yielded to [Mrs. Mauro's] insistent demands' to see her husband). Such a view is difficult to accept, however, as Mrs. Mauro had no legal right to see her husband, and the decision whether to allow Mrs. Mauro to see her husband was entirely within police discretion.
In earlier cases, the police had expressly refused to allow a suspect to see his spouse or
family member when the police believed that such a discussion might interfere with
"breaking" the suspect. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1963) (holding
confession involuntary in part because police refused to allow suspect to contact wife until
he had confessed); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957) (holding confession involuntary in part because police refused to allow father to speak with defendant until after
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chose to respond to his wife's entreaties, when he could simply have ig-

nored her."" Given Mauro's "decision" to speak, "his volunteered
statements cannot properly be considered the result of police interrogation. ,198 In reaching this conclusion, the Court appeared to limit "interrogation" to actions or statements by the police that would "coerce[] [a
suspect] to incriminate himself."' 99 Ironically, where Miranda required
warnings to dispel the presumptively coercive atmosphere that arises
when police officers implement strategies designed to evoke incriminating responses from suspects in custody, Mauro turns this on its head, refusing to require warnings until the atmosphere has, in fact, become coercive.2°° The presumption of coercion that prompted the Court to adopt
Miranda warnings is thus overlooked.
As in Innis, the Mauro Court was again willing to accept law enforcement justifications as proof that an officer had not designed his words or
actions to elicit an incriminating response.'
Based upon Innis and
he confessed); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948) (holding confession involuntary in
part because police refused to allow mother to speak with defendant until after he confessed). Here, the police allowed the spouse to see the suspect and the resulting conversation helped to develop the case against Mauro. The Court accepted this result as merely a
coincidence-a characterization that is either incredibly naive or more than a little dishonest, given that the Court had previously recognized such confrontations as "'another way
of getting a confession."' Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 613 (1961) (quoting testimony of Lieutenant Rome, who had arranged for wife to confront Culombe in order to
obtain a confession from Culombe).
197. See Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527-28 n.5.
198. Id. at 529.
199. Id. at 528 ("We doubt that a suspect, told by officers that his wife will be allowed
to speak to him, would feel that he was being coerced to incriminate himself in any way.").
The Court further explained:
In deciding whether particular police conduct is interrogation, we must remember the purpose behind our decisions in Miranda and Edwards: preventing
government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract
confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment. The Government actions in this case do not implicate this purpose in any way.
Id. at 529-30.
200. See White, supra note 18, at 588 (noting that "the Court appears to have restricted its definition of 'custodial interrogation' to situations that involve 'coercive environments' similar to those considered by the Court in Miranda itself. Thus, unless a suspect is actually subjected to the coercive pressures generated by involuntary restraints and
interrogation in a police station-like atmosphere, Miranda seems to be inapplicable."
(footnotes omitted)).
201. See Mauro, 481 U.S. at 523-24. The Court quoted the Arizona trial court's explanations for the officer's presence:
The police justifiably appeared [concerned] for Mrs. Mauro's ... safety, and they
were also concerned about security, both in terms of whether Mr. and Mrs.
Mauro might cook up a lie or swap statements with each other that shouldn't
have been allowed, and whether some escape attempt might have been made, or
whether there might have been an attempt to smuggle in a weapon.
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Mauro, the Court appears willing to permit the police to apply even welldocumented interrogation techniques, so long as they are applied to a
suspect in an oblique manner and the officer has a reasonable explanation for the conduct. 2°1 Such an approach virtually strips all meaning
from the "functional equivalent" standard because a resourceful police
officer can almost always find a legitimate non-interrogation-related rationale for his conduct, even without coaching from the district attorney's
office.20 3 By giving such an artificially narrow ambit to the "functional
equivalent" standard, the Court frustrates the very purpose of the standard, thereby "'plac[ing] a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interrogation."' 2 Under this standard, very little police conduct will amount to the "functional equivalent" of express
questioning, and police will have ample room to pressure a suspect to
talk. 201 Once the suspect has said something-no matter how seemingly
Id.
202. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 n.9 (1980) (finding that appeal to
conscience was not expressly directed at Innis, and accepting trial judge's observation that
it was "'entirely understandable"' that officers would express concern about safety of
handicapped children). Confrontations between suspects, or between a parent and a juvenile suspect, are also a well-known interrogation strategy, since police can reasonably anticipate that incriminating statements are likely in the heat of the confrontation. See, e.g.,
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1964) (during police-arranged confrontation
with another suspect, defendant stated, "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it"). In Mauro,
however, the Court accepted testimony that the police had not created the confrontation,
but merely "yielded" to Mrs. Mauro's request to see her spouse. See Mauro, 481 U.S. at
528.
203. See, e.g., Mauro, 481 U.S. at 523-24, 528 (noting both legitimate law enforcement
reasons for officer's presence and the "possibility" that allowing Mr. Mauro to speak with
his wife would lead to incriminating statements).
204. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 n.3 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 285 A.2d 172, 175
(Pa. 1971)).
205. One of the most common approaches is to confront the defendant with witnesses
or other evidence linking him to the crime, and then see if the defendant responds. In
some cases, the officers go further and expressly ask whether the defendant wishes to reconsider his silence or request for counsel after viewing the evidence. The use of this
strategy is ironic given that more than one hundred years ago, in Brain v. United States,
168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court clearly recognized the compulsion inherent in such confrontations:
[I]t cannot, with justice, be said that the mind of one who is held in custody under
suspicion of having committed a crime, would not be impelled to say something,
when informed by one in authority that a co-suspect had declared that he had
seen the person to whom the officer was addressing himself, commit the offense.
Id. at 563. Despite this long-standing recognition, some courts, in applying the Innis/Mauro standard, have ruled that such confrontations are not likely to elicit a response
and, therefore, are not interrogation. Compare United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 20103 (4th Cir. 1992) (refusing to find interrogation where police officer told suspect "'[t]hey
found a gun at your house,"' and suspect made incriminating statements in response), and
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innocent-that
remark may turn out to be inculpatory in an unexpected
206
way, and those first words often become a torrent of further explanation. °7
C. Erosionof Miranda's Enforcement Rules
In setting out to address the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, the Miranda Court insisted that "[t]he requirement of warnings
and waiver of rights is . . . not simply a preliminary ritual to existing

methods of interrogation. ' 0 To ensure that its decision effected real
change in police-suspect interactions, the Miranda Court set forth enforcement rules in mandatory and seemingly unambiguous language intended to parallel the language of the warnings.'w "[W]ithout the full
warnings and effective waiver," a defendant's statement made in response to custodial interrogation may not be used either to establish guilt
directly, or "to impeach his testimony at trial.., and thus prove guilt by

Lewis v. State, 509 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to find interrogation where police showed suspect videotape of crime and suspect made incriminating
statements in response), with Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 935-36 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding interrogation where police confronted the suspect with his alleged co-suspect and
told him that his partner had confessed). The notion that confronting a suspect with the
evidence against him is not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response is sharply
at odds with the large number of reported cases in which such a confrontation has, in fact,
elicited such a response. In addition to the cases cited above, see also United States v.
Benton, 996 F.2d 642, 643 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing incriminating statements made in response to officer's statement that he saw suspect attempt to conceal gun); United States v.
Pheaster,544 F.2d 353, 365 (9th Cir. 1976) (describing successful use of approach of agents
telling suspect he had been implicated because of his fingerprints); United States v. Hodge,
487 F.2d 945, 946 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that defendant made incriminating statement in
response to statement of evidence against him).
206. For example, in United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1989), a DEA
agent, in response to the defendant's protestations that he was not involved with drugs,
responded "'[jiust think about Harry Payne,"' referring to the person to whom the defendant allegedly delivered cocaine. See id. at 1171. The defendant's false exculpatory response that he did not know Harry Payne was introduced at his trial. See id.; see also
United States v. Taylor, 799 F.2d 126, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1986) (allowing defendant's identification of himself as "Snake" into evidence, after defendant had invoked right to counsel,
where co-defendant had stated that he had robbed the bank with a man named "Snake").
207. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 328-32, 356-57 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing numerous sources for the ease with which further statements can be obtained once the first admission, described "as the 'breakthrough' and the 'beachhead,"'
has been obtained); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 483-92 (1964) (holding unconstitutional the method by which police obtained a confession from a suspect, that is,
confronting him with a co-suspect so that he would implicate himself, then obtaining additional statements).
208. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
209. See id. at 467-77.
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21 "If the individual indicates in any manner . . . that he
implication.""
wishes to remain silent," or "wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease." 2 1 Moreover, "[olpportunity to exercise
these rights must be af212

forded to him throughout the interrogation.,

Despite this seemingly clear language, the Court has subsequently
eroded key aspects of these enforcement rules."' The first inroad came
in Harrisv. New York. 21' Despite the fact that language in Miranda could
be viewed as barring any use of a statement obtained in violation of
Miranda, the Burger Court held that statements preceded by defective
Miranda warnings, while inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
could nevertheless be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant
took the stand in his own defense. 211 In a series of later decisions, the
Court further expanded this impeachment exception, substantially undermining a suspect's right to remain silent. 211
Similarly, although language in Miranda would seem to indicate
that once a suspect invokes his right to silence the police are barred from
further questioning, the Court has permitted police reinitiation of ques-

210. Id. at 477.
211. Id. at 473-74.
212. Id. at 479; see also id. at 473-74 ("If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease."); see id. at 475-76 ("Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is
no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers some
questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent
when interrogated.").
213. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 27, at 1839-41 (noting various efforts to limit
Miranda'sreach and scope).
214. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
215. See 401 U.S. at 222, 224-26 ("The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances."). The Harris Court reached this holding notwithstanding its acknowledgement that "[s]ome comments" from Miranda could be read as
barring any use of a statement obtained in violation of its requirements. See id. at 224.
216. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-07 (1982) (allowing impeachment use
of defendant's silence in response to custodial interrogation where police failed to provide
Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1980) (allowing impeachment use of defendant's silence in response to pre-custodial interrogation). But see Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (holding impermissible the impeachment use of defendant's silence in response to custodial interrogation where Miranda warnings had been
given). For a survey of these decisions, see OLP REPORT, supra note 2, at 527-30 (discussing Court's decision to allow impeachment use of defendant's silence). The Court has
similarly allowed impeachment use of a statement obtained through custodial interrogation after a suspect invokes his right to counsel. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23
(1975); see also infra text and accompanying notes 227-28 (discussing Minnick v. Mississippi and Oregon v. Hass).
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1 7 the sustioning under certain circumstances. In Michigan v. Mosley,"
pect was arrested on robbery charges, was given Miranda warnings, and
invoked his right to silence, after which interrogation was immediately
terminated."' More than two hours later, while Mosley was still in jail, a
different detective gave Mosley fresh Miranda warnings, obtained a written waiver of Mosley's Miranda rights, and interrogated Mosley solely
about an unrelated murder."' Mosley made incriminating statements
about this murder, which he later sought to have suppressed on the
grounds that he should not have been interrogated about any crime in
view of his earlier invocation of his right to remain silent. The Court disagreed, finding that police reinitiation of interrogation was permissible
under these circumstances.2 Important to the Court's decision was the
fact that the police 'scrupulously honored"' Mosley's right to silence by
immediately terminating the first interrogation, and that interrogation
was resumed "only after the passage of a significant period of time and..
. provision of a fresh set of [Miranda] warnings," and police "restricted
the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the
earlier interrogation."2 "' Although limiting interrogation to a different
crime than the subject of the earlier interrogation appeared to be a crucial consideration to the Mosley Court, some later courts have222permitted
police reinitiation of interrogation concerning the same crime.

Similar erosion is apparent in the enforcement rules pertaining to the
right to have counsel present. At the outset, the Court held that in order
for a suspect to invoke his right to counsel, he "must unambiguously request counsel., 223 Moreover, if a suspect makes some reference to having
217. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
218. See id. at 97.
219. See id. at 97-98.
220. See id. at 98, 104.
221. Id. at 104-06.
222. See United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 1998) (permitting
reinitiation of interrogation concerning same crime after suspect had invoked right to
counsel and where six days had passed during which time suspect was not in custody), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 255 (1998); Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1471 (11th Cir. 1988)
(characterizing defendant's Miranda rights as "scrupulously honored" where defendant
continuously invoked right to silence, and in response, police stopped questioning but then
attempted to resume an hour later; when defendant again invoked right to silence, police
again stopped questioning only to resume three to four hours later; on third attempt, defendant finally made an inculpatory statement); United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174,
1181-82 (11th Cir. 1982) (permitting reinitiation of interrogation concerning same crime
after suspect had invoked right to silence where several weeks had passed between interrogations).
223. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 421-27 (1986) (holding that police may continue interrogation without informing
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an attorney present, but does not request counsel "unambiguously," the
police may continue to question the suspect, and are not required to ask
clarifying questions to determine whether or not the individual is attempting to invoke his right to counsel. 224 Even where an unambiguous
request for counsel is made, the scope of the request may be confined to
the request's precise language. 22' Rendering a suspect's right to counsel
dependent on the precise language the suspect uses assumes a degree of
sophistication and articulateness rarely found in the average criminal
suspect, and runs directly counter to Miranda's warning that an unduly
strict request requirement "'would22 6discriminate against ... the very defendant who most needs counsel.'
However, once a suspect who is undergoing custodial interrogation
manages to make an unambiguous request for counsel, the Court has
protected the right to counsel more scrupulously than it has the right to
silence, and has taken to heart Miranda'sadmonition that once a suspect
invokes his right to counsel, interrogation may not resume until counsel

suspect that an attorney is attempting to contact him if suspect himself has not requested
an attorney). In Davis, the defendant initially waived his Miranda rights and was interrogated about a murder. 512 U.S. at 455. About one and a half hours into the interview,
Davis stated, "'[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer."' Id. When the agents inquired into
whether Davis was requesting counsel, Davis stated that he was not. See id. Questioning
continued, and Davis made several incriminating statements. See id. Davis later sought to
have these statements suppressed on the grounds that he had been questioned after invoking his right to counsel. See id.
224. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62. As the Davis Court explained:
Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not
he actually wants an attorney .... But we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous
or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.
Id.
225. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 527-30 (1987) (finding that a suspect's
statement that he would not give a written statement without an attorney present but had
"no problem" talking about crime in question was only a limited request for counsel; because request did not specifically extend to oral questioning, police could proceed with
such questioning).
226. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (quoting People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d
361, 369-70 (Cal. 1965)); see also Ogletree, supra note 27, at 1841 (noting that "it is unlikely that the suspects would have waived their Miranda rights if they had clearly understood the consequences, or if they first had an opportunity to consult with counsel"); cf
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) (refusing to equate minor's request for his
probation officer with a request for counsel). In his dissent in Fare, Justice Marshall
opined that "[a] juvenile in these circumstances will likely turn to his parents, or another
adult responsible for his welfare, as the only means of securing legal counsel." Id. at 730
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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is present."' Nevertheless, the Court has placed limitations on enforcement of Miranda'sright to counsel as well. The Court has allowed, for
example, impeachment use of statements obtained through custodial interrogation that continues even after a suspect has unambiguously invoked his right to counsel."' In addition, although the Court has prohibited the police from reinitiating interrogation once a suspect has invoked
his right to counsel, the police may resume questioning if the suspect reinitiates further communication with the police.29 Although there is
nothing inherently wrong with such an approach, the Court, in Oregon v.
Bradshaw,230 established an absurdly low threshold for suspect "reinitiation" sufficient to open the door for further police questioning."' In the

227. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that after suspect
invokes right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, police may not reinitiate questioning without counsel present even if suspect has had opportunity to meet and confer
with his counsel); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988) (holding that after
suspect invokes right to counsel in response to Mirandawarnings, police may not reinitiate
questioning even if questioning concerns offense unrelated to subject of initial interrogation); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981) (holding that after suspect invokes
right to counsel in response to Miranda warnings, police may not reinitiate questioning).
The Court in Miranda was specific:
If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease
until an attorney is present.... If authorities conclude that they will not provide
counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is
carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth
Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time.
384 U.S. at 474.
228. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975) (allowing impeachment use of a
statement made after a suspect had invoked his right to counsel, but where the police had
refused to honor the suspect's right by continuing to interrogate him without counsel present).
229. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,1043-44 (1983).
230. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
231. In Bradshaw, the defendant was questioned while in custody concerning a singlecar automobile accident in which the owner of the vehicle (who was a passenger at the
time of the accident) was killed. See id. at 1041. In response to police questioning, Bradshaw admitted that he had furnished alcohol to the victim, a minor, but denied involvement in the automobile accident that caused the victim's death. See id. At this point,
Bradshaw invoked his right to counsel, and questioning immediately ceased. See id. at
1041-42. Sometime later, while Bradshaw was being transferred from the police station to
the county jail, Bradshaw asked of a police officer, "'[w]ell, what is going to happen to me
now?"' Id. at 1042. The police officer reminded Bradshaw that he did not need to talk to
the police because Bradshaw had invoked his right to counsel. See id. Bradshaw stated
that he understood, and thereafter a discussion of the crime for which Bradshaw would be
charged occurred. See id. The police officer recommended that Bradshaw undergo a
polygraph test to which Bradshaw agreed. See id. The following day, after Bradshaw received fresh Miranda warnings and waived his Miranda rights, Bradshaw underwent the
polygraph. See id. When the polygraph showed evidence of deception, Bradshaw eventually recanted his original story and admitted that he had been driving the victim's car at
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Bradshaw case, the suspect, after invoking his right to counsel, and while
being transferred to county jail, merely asked: "'Well, what is going to
happen to me now?' 23 2 A plurality of the Court held that this inquiry
opened the door for further police interrogation because it "evinced a
willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of
the custodial relationship," such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use the telephone. Although the Court required a showing of
fresh Miranda warnings after Bradshaw's reinitiation of questioning and
a valid waiver of those rights, allowing reinitiation on such a slight pretense makes plain to a suspect that the warnings are a mere legal formality. 234 Facing such a resumption of interrogation, practical reality for the
suspect quickly becomes
"interrogation will continue [or recur] until a
235
obtained.,
is
confession
the time of the accident. See id.
232. Id. at 1042.
233. Id. at 1045-46. Justice Marshall dissented and, joined by three other Justices, expressed difficulty with the plurality's permissive interpretation of suspect reinitiation. See
id. at 1051 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissenters believed that the standard would
permit authorities "to capitalize on the custodial setting. Yet Miranda's procedural protections were adopted precisely in order 'to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings."' Id. at 1056 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 456 (1966)) (arguing that the plurality's conclusion of valid suspect reinitiation
"flies in the face of the basic purpose of the Mirandasafeguards").
234. See Ogletree, supra note 27, at 1840 ("Thus, suspects view the subsequent recitation of Miranda rights as a mere formality rather than a substantive cure for a defective
confession."). The Court in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), voiced a similar
concern:
Thus, we also disagree with petitioner's contention that fresh sets of Miranda
warnings will 'reassure' a suspect who has been denied the counsel he has clearly
requested that his rights have remained untrammeled. Especially in a case such
as this, in which a period of three days elapsed between the unsatisfied request
for counsel and the interrogation about a second offense, there is a serious risk
that the mere repetition of the Miranda warnings would not overcome the presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged police custody.
Id. at 686 (citation ommitted).
235. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468 ("It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly
stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in
the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury."); Professor Schulhofer suggests that well-educated defendants also are susceptible to this pressure:
Even the sophisticated law professor or professional investigator, if he found
himself suspected of crime, would be under considerable pressure to cooperate
with the police, to try to get them on his side by telling what he knew or what he
thought he could safely disclose, rather than standing confidently on his right to
remain silent.
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 2, at 448.
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Additional erosion of the Miranda protections has occurred in the area
of subsequent confessions, where police secure a voluntary, but unwarned, first confession from a suspect, and then later, after reading the
suspect his Miranda warnings, obtain a second voluntary confession. 36 In
Oregon v. Elstad,237 the Court concluded that while the first, unwarned
confession must be suppressed as a violation of Miranda, the second confession was admissible so long as it was voluntarily made.
In so holding, the Court rejected as "speculative and attenuated" the notion that
once a suspect confesses, he will likely repeat that confession even after
being apprised of his Miranda rights, unless the suspect is specifically advised that his first, unwarned confession is likely inadmissible.23 9 The
Court rejected the so-called "cat-out-of-the-bag" presumption despite
the existence of police interrogation manuals that emphasize the impor140
tance of securing the initial admission in obtaining a full confession.

236. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300-01 (1985). In this case, Elstad, an eighteen-year old still living at his parents' home, was taken into custody for a neighborhood
burglary. See id. at 300-01. While still at the Elstad residence, the officer told Elstad that
he thought Elstad was involved in the burglary, to which Elstad responded, "'[y]es I was
there."' Id. at 301. Elstad was first advised of his Miranda rights about an hour later at
police headquarters. See id. Elstad waived his Miranda rights and gave a full confession
concerning the burglary. See id.
237. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
238. See id. at 318.
239. See id. at 313-14. The Court refused to apply the "'fruit of the poisonous tree"'
analysis to the second confession because there was only a "procedural Miranda violation"
involving the first confession, but no actual Fifth Amendment violation. See id. at 305-06;
see also Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 922-27 (1995) (arguing that "fruits" obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment should be admissible).
240. See, e.g., ARTHUR S. AUBRY, JR. & RUDOLPH R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 26 (3d ed. 1980); WILLIAM DIENSTEIN, TECHNICS FOR THE CRIME
INVESTIGATOR 117 (2d ed. 1974); ROBERT F. ROYAL & STEVEN R. SCHUTT, THE
GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION: A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL
AND GUIDE 143 (1976); see also supra note 207 (noting the existence of sources that ex-

plain the ease with which further statements can be obtained after the first admission has
been secured). The Elstad dissent rejected, as "marble-palace psychoanalysis," the majority's assumption that the initial unwarned admission does not precondition the suspect to
confess again after receiving Miranda warnings. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). As Justice Brennan, in dissent, explained:
The Court's marble-palace psychoanalysis is tidy, but it flies in the face of our
own precedents, demonstrates a startling unawareness of the realities of police
interrogation, and is completely out of tune with the experience of state and federal courts over the last 20 years. Perhaps the Court has grasped some psychological truth that has eluded persons far more experienced in these matters; if so,
the Court owes an explanation of how so many could have been so wrong for so
many years.
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Further, despite language in Elstad intended to deter police officers from
using deliberately manipulative practices that pre-condition the unwarned suspect to confess again, 241 in practice, Elstad has served as a license for police to gain incriminating responses through unwarned custodial interrogation and then "cleanse" any later confessions by
administering Mirandawarnings and obtaining a valid waiver.242
The Burger Court has also made the task of establishing a suspect's
waiver of Mirandarights much easier. Despite language in Miranda that
appeared to require an express waiver that would satisfy the "high stan243
dards of proof" necessary to establish waiver of a constitutional right,
the Burger Court in North Carolina v. Butler,24" ruled that Miranda did
not require an express waiver. 245 Further, despite the Miranda Court's
"heavy burden" language concerning proof of waiver,246 a waiver of
241. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (concluding that "absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial [unwarned] statement,... [a] subsequent administration of Miranda warnings.., ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement").
242. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 683-84 (1993) (observing that officers
"[aifter consulting with each other" decided to withhold Miranda warnings during initial
questioning of Williams; only after Williams "began to implicate himself" was he advised
of his Miranda rights, which he waived and during subsequent questioning gave additional
incriminating responses). In Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998), police interrogated a seventeen-year-old boy concerning the murder of his mother and grave injuries to his father without giving Miranda warnings. See id. at 240. They questioned him in
a ten-foot by ten-foot windowless room for two hours; during this time they openly expressed disbelief concerning his version of events, and raised their voices but never yelled
at him. See id. at 240-41. In addition, they faked receiving a telephone call from a detective at the hospital after which they (falsely) informed the son that his father had awakened from a coma and accused his son of the crime. See id. at 241. In response, the son
made inculpatory statements, and only then did the police give him his Miranda warnings.
See id. The court ruled that while the un-Mirandized statements should have been suppressed, the post-Miranda confession was admissible: "under Elstad, the interrogation that
took place before the reading of the Miranda warnings barely did not entail that degree of
coercion that would irredeemably taint [defendant's] 'second,' Mirandized confession."
Id. at 245.
243. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 475 (1966) (requiring waiver issue to
be resolved under "high standards of proof" for waiver of constitutional right established
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and noting that "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained"); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470
("No effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless
specifically made after the warnings .. .have been given."); see also Sonenshein, supra
note 27, at 431-32 (discussing the Court's interpretation of Miranda'swaiver requirements
in a later case).
244. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
245. See id. at 373; Sonenshein, supra note 27, at 431-34.
246. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 ("If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to

1999]

The Erosion of Miranda

Miranda rights must be proven by only a preponderance of the evidence.247
D. Exceptions to Miranda
Not only have the Burger and Rehnquist Courts narrowed the circumstances under which Miranda warnings are required and the associated
enforcement rules become applicable, but the post-Warren Court also
has created exceptions to Miranda. For each exception, an individual has
been subjected to custodial interrogation, yet the Court has held that
Miranda's warning requirements are nevertheless inapplicable. First, in
New York v. Quarles,"' the Court created a "public safety" exception to
the requirement that Miranda warnings be given prior to custodial interrogation. Under this exception, an officer need not provide Miranda
warnings to an individual in custody when the officer asks questions that
are reasonably motivated by a concern for public safety." 9 Second, in
Rhode Island v. Innis,250 the Court excluded from the definition of "interrogation" police questioning or conduct "normally attendant to arrest
'
and custody."251
This exception came to be known as the "routine booking" exception.
Although
a plurality of the Court attempted in Pennsylx r•252
vania v. Muniz to confine this exception to "questions [that] secure the
'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services,"' 253
lower courts have seemingly ignored the plurality's admonition that even
routine booking questions may constitute "interrogation" where the
questions are "designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."254 Third, in
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.").
247. See Colorado v. Connolly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) ("If, as we held in Lego v.
Twomey, the voluntariness of a confession need be established only by a preponderance of
the evidence, then a waiver of the auxiliary protections established in Miranda should require no higher burden of proof." (citation omitted)).
248. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
249. See id. at 655-56.
250. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
251. See id. at 301.
252. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
253. Id. at 601.
254. Id. at 602 n.14; see, e.g., United States v. Excell, 953 F.2d 640 (table), available in
1992 WL 5003, **4-5 (4th Cir. Jan. 16, 1992) (finding questions concerning defendant's
ownership interests in property proper under "routine booking" exception even though
defendant had invoked right to silence); United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 525 (7th
Cir. 1989) (finding questions concerning defendant's property ownership and bank accounts proper under "routine booking" exception even though defendant had invoked
right to counsel). Even the Muniz plurality appeared to ignore the admonition set out in
footnote 14, given that the police should have known that the routine booking questions at
issue (Muniz's name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and age) were rea-
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Illinois v. Perkins,255 the Court held that "Miranda warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law enforcement officer., 25 6 Under this exception, police may interrogate an individual in custody, so long as they use an informant or undercover officer
and thereby ensure that the individual remains unaware that he is being
questioned by the police.257
IV. EVALUATING THE EROSION OF MIRANDA
As the preceding sections reflect, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
have chipped away at Miranda over the past twenty-seven years. 258
Without expressly overruling Miranda, they have undermined its constitutional stature, narrowed unreasonably the circumstances under which
Miranda will apply, eviscerated Miranda's parallel enforcement rules,
and created exceptions to Miranda's seemingly direct commands. In
evaluating this erosion, two questions arise. First, is the erosion a desirable change in the law? Second, and perhaps more importantly, is this an
appropriate way for the Court to revise constitutional doctrine?
The Court, Congress, and numerous commentators and public officials

have taken up the first issue, with largely inconclusive results.

29

Despite

valiant efforts to blame Miranda for a variety of social ills, the evidence

concerning Miranda's consequences on crime and society's ability to
solve crimes and obtain convictions is largely inconclusive.

Too many

sonably likely to demonstrate that Muniz was intoxicated, and therefore, tended to prove
the crime of driving while under the influence. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 610-11 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also United States v. Sotelo, 2 F.3d 1058,
1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (asking defendant his name for "the direct and admitted purpose of
linking [defendant] to his incriminating immigration file" constituted interrogation and did
not fall under "routine booking" exception). Further, in Muniz, the fact that the Pennsylvania police typically videotaped the booking procedure of persons arrested for driving
while intoxicated demonstrated that the questioning was for purposes other than "recordkeeping." See 496 U.S. at 611 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
256. Id. at 294.
257. See id.; see also id. at 309 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that majority's decision incorporates an "'undercover agent"' exception to the Miranda rule [that] is necessarily also the adoption of a substantial loophole in our jurisprudence protecting suspects'
Fifth Amendment rights").
258. Justice Brennan has described Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), as the
beginning of Miranda's erosion. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) ("Miranda warnings may inhibit
persons from giving information"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) ("[t]f
the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred from responding.");
see also supra note 2.

1999]

The Erosion of Miranda

other factors contribute to crime and clearance rates to permit assigning
a significant or specific causal role to Miranda with any confidence, except perhaps for purposes of political posturing.' 60
Moreover, few seemed to have considered carefully the fact that
eroding Miranda reestablishes voluntariness as the central gatekeeper in
determining the admissibility of confessions in an increasing number of
circumstances. 6' The central difficulties that drove the Warren
S 262 Court to
seek some alternative to the voluntariness standard remain, but perhaps the Burger and Rehnquist Courts now see these difficulties as advantages.163 Returning to this standard will undoubtedly increase the
chance of an individual's conviction based upon an improperly obtained
confession, 6 4 but the fact-intensive nature of the analysis at least insu260. For an example of such posturing, see the Senate Report accompanying enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. S. REP. No. 1097, at
41-46 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2127-32 (quoting various studies, which
appear to be unscientific, to support view that Miranda was a "most disastrous blow to the
cause of law enforcement"); see also Sonenshein, supra note 27, at 405-06 n.6 (noting reported statements of Police Commissioner Howard R. Leary that Miranda "'will certainly
restrict us in our effectiveness"' and "'[tihere should be some diminishing of law and order
as a result"').
261. In the early years after Miranda, some believed that Miranda's admissibility requirements had entirely displaced the voluntariness approach. See, e.g., SOBEL, supra
note 31, at 30 ("We need not spend any time with definitions of voluntariness. Miranda
Hereafter the sole tests to be used in determining
makes such definitions obsolete ....
'admissibility' will be 'custody,' 'warnings' and 'waiver."'). With Miranda's erosion, the
voluntariness standard becomes correspondingly more important. See, e.g., Elstad, 470
U.S. at 307-08 ("Where an unwarned statement is preserved for use in situations that fall
outside the sweep of the Miranda presumption, 'the primary criterion of admissibility [becomes] the "old" due process voluntariness test."') (quoting Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 877 (1981)).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
263. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 711-12 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part):
Miranda, for all its alleged brightness, is not without its difficulties; and voluntariness is not without its strengths .... Miranda creates as many close questions
as it resolves....
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other hand, permits each
fact to be taken into account without resort to formal and dispositive labels. By
dispensing with the difficulty of producing a yes-or-no answer to questions that
are often better answered in shades and degrees, the voluntariness inquiry often
can make judicial decisionmaking easier rather than more onerous.
Id.; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT.
REV. 99, 168 (arguing that the Court's narrow interpretations are based upon a "fundamental rejection of the premises of Miranda and an apparent desire to return, ultimately,
to the 'voluntariness' standard").
264. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 59-83 (1993).
Professor Grano, one of Miranda'sconsistent critics, recognizes that abandoning Miranda
would lead to a return to the voluntariness standard, and acknowledges the weakness of
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lated the Court from responsibility for the results in any given case. 265 A
return to the voluntariness standard thereby allows the Court to maintain
the appearance of concern over the acquisition and use of coerced confessions,
while washing its hands of the improprieties that will inevitably
266
result.
In any event, while debates concerning the substantive merits (or demerits) of Miranda will undoubtedly continue, evaluation of the manner
in which the Court has addressed Miranda and identification of the
Court's proper role within our governmental structure may prove more
vital over the long run. Yet, this question has gone largely unaddressed.
Commentators and the Court have discussed whether Miranda itself was
a legitimate exercise of judicial authority, but the issue of how the Court
may legitimately treat Miranda once it has been decided has received far
267
less attention.
that doctrine as presently formulated. See id. In conjunction with his plea for reversal of
Miranda, Professor Grano also proposes a revised voluntariness standard that he argues
would serve better to separate admissible and inadmissible confessions than either the traditional voluntariness approach or Miranda. See id. at 87-118. While a critique of his voluntariness approach is beyond the scope of this article, others have noted that his approach is not unproblematic. See, e.g., Daniel P. Collins, Farewell Miranda?, 1995 PUB.
INTEREST L. REV. 185, 196-99 (reviewing JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH,
AND THE LAW (1993)) (critiquing Grano's proposed voluntariness analysis and standard).
265. Miranda'serosion increases the likelihood that state court judges, many of whom
are elected, may view apprising suspects of their federal constitutional rights as an unreasonable impediment to effective law enforcement efforts, and therefore would minimize
the significance of this factor, as many pre-Mirandacourts did, in determining voluntariness. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. One substantial danger that arises from a
return to the voluntariness analysis is that it will enable judges to make results-oriented
admissibility decisions that are largely insulated from effective appellate review due to the
number of considerations involved in the totality of the circumstances test. See supra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
266. The Court has heightened the risks that coerced confessions will be obtained and
used to convict an individual by reversing the Court's historic practice and applying the
harmless error rule in cases where a coerced confession was improperly admitted. See
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court endorsed use of Chapman's harmless error analysis in a case involving coerced confession, despite the fact that Chapman itself identified use of a coerced confession as an
example of a constitutional error that could not be categorized as harmless); see also Louis
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 746 (1992) (observing that
lower courts take a "cavalier" attitude toward Due Process claims because so few have
been upheld by the Court in recent years).
267. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (refusing to withhold decision to give the legislatures a chance to address the issue because "the issues presented are
of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the courts"), Schulhofer, ReconsideringMiranda, supra note 2, at 436, 440, 448-53 (justifying Miranda'sruling as a proper
exercise of judicial authority), and David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 191-95, 209 (1988) (same), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 510 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's ruling as a "trompe l'oeil"), OLP REPORT, supra note 2,
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It is undisputed that the Court has the authority to change direction,
particularly with constitutional decisions, where the amendment process
is too unwieldy to function as a viable alternative for legal change. 268
Nevertheless, if a majority of the Court comes to believe that a prior constitutional decision has been wrongly decided, the question remains
whether the Court should (1) simply overrule the decision, or (2) pretend
to honor the decision while eviscerating its substance. In its history, the
Court has used both approaches. In the 1930s, the Court in Nebbia v.
27 ° rejected the principle
New York2 69 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
that the Constitution prohibited government imposition of price and
271
wage controls, specifically overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
273
272
and signaling the demise of the Lochner approach to Due Process.
Similarly, in the 1950s, Brown v. Board of Education214 rejected the separate-but-equal approach to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec

at 543 (criticizing Miranda as improper exercise of judicial authority), and Grano, Schulhofer Reply, supra note 24, at 176-81 (same).
268. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (noting that "[s]tare decisis
is not an inexorable command ... particularly ... in constitutional cases, because in such
cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible"') (quoting Burnet v.
dissenting) (citation omitCoronado Oil & Gas Co., 205 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
ted)).
269. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
270. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
271. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
272. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking maximum hours statute as an
improper deprivation of liberty), overruled in part by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
273. The Lochner era has generated a vast body of literature. For a limited sample,
see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 63-66 (1991); JOSEPH ALSOP
& TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR
GOVERNMENT 121-28 (1994); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 114-45 (1993);
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188-208

(Phoenix Books 1967) (1942); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L.
REV. 201 (1994); Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression,the New Deal, and the American Legal Order,59 WASH. L. REV. 723, 728-35 (1984). The key holdings of the Lochner
era were reversed in a series of decisions from 1934 through 1949. See Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (unanimously
and explicitly rejecting "Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine");
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
274. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion Clause, 211 overruling Plessy v. Ferguson.276
In dealing with Miranda, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have preferred the second approach. Whether they have done so in an attempt to
distinguish themselves from the perceived activism of the Warren Court
or for some other reason is, for purposes of this article, largely immaterial. Rather, the concern here is solely a pragmatic one: to suggest the
relative costs and benefits of these two approaches towards revising constitutional doctrine.
The ultimate penalty available for undue Court activism on constitutional issues is well-known: the other branches may refuse to support the
Court's decision. Roosevelt's court-packing plan 277 and Eisenhower's
reluctance
to supply
federal troops necessary to enforce the Court's
deseregaion
• • the278
desegregation decisions are perhaps the best examples of cases where
the Court's constitutional interpretations raised the possibility of this ultimate price. Yet, although they clearly delineate one limit on the
Court's otherwise final say on constitutional issues, cases where the
Court revises constitutional doctrine rarely threaten such a crisis. In the
vast• 279
majority of cases that may be said to involve constitutional revision, regardless of how the Court decides, Congress and the Executive
will proceed with more or less enthusiasm to acknowledge the validity,
though not necessarily the desirability, of the Court's action. °

275. See id. at 495. Like Lochner, the Brown decision has generated voluminous literature. For a small sample, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial
Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959).
276. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
277. For discussions of the court-packing plan, see LEO PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE
COURT 295-320 (1965); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA
481-501 (1965).
278. For a discussion of President Eisenhower and Brown, see 2 STEPHEN E.
AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 410, 416-18, 421 (1984); ROBERT FREDERICK
BURK, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 173, 185-86
(1984); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA.
L. REV. 7, 130-32 (1994).
279. For purposes of this article, "constitutional revision" is an umbrella term that includes change of any sort in constitutional doctrine, including what some may call "development" or "interpretation" of existing constitutional doctrine. Even where the Court
attempts to honor the spirit and the letter of existing constitutional doctrine, interstitial
development of doctrine nevertheless involves change, and will be considered a form of
revision.
280. Thus, even though the Senate sharply disagreed with the Court's Lochner-era approach, it also disagreed with Roosevelt's court-packing plan as an appropriate solution.
See S. REP. No. 711, at 23 (1937) (condemning the court-packing plan "as a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle").
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In evaluating constitutional revision, rather than focus on the extremely remote possibility that the Executive may refuse to enforce the
Court's
• 281 order or that Congress may cutoff funding as a result of the decision, a pragmatic analysis should instead examine the more commonplace consequences of the Court's approach to revision. These include
the approach's effects on (1) the predictability of the law; (2) the certainty of the law; (3) the reliance on the law; (4) the desirability of the
law; and (5) the integrity of the judicial process.282
In the abstract,' a gradual evolution of constitutional doctrine would
seem to be generally preferable to the Court's frank reversal of a prior
constitutional decision.2 8 Gradual change makes it easier for the courts,
and perhaps even private citizens, to anticipate the likely direction in

281. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion of
Justice O'Connor) ("As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the
Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies,
rather, in its legitimacy .... ).
282. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SuP. CT.
HIST. 13, 15-16 (identifying efficiency, stability, and public legitimacy as principal justifications for stare decisis); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmakingand Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 76-87 (1991); Earl Maltz,
The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368-72 (1988) (arguing that stare decisis is
supported by four considerations: certainty and reliance, equality, efficiency, and the appearance of justice and avoidance of arbitrary decisionmaking); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 744-53 (1988) (recognizing arguments for stare decisis include promotion of consistency, coherence, fairness,
equality, predictability, and efficiency, and adding legitimacy arguments as additional justification); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1987) (arguing a
similar set of four justifications for stare decisis: fairness, predictability, strengthened decisionmaking, and stability). Some commentators are more skeptical of the value of stare
decisis, particularly with respect to constitutional issues. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principlein ConstitutionalAdjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402
(1988) (arguing that "stare decisis has always been a doctrine of convenience, to both conservatives and liberals" on the Court); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994) (arguing for limited application of stare
decisis in constitutional decisions).
283. As Professor Maltz has noted, "[aill of these benefits [from stare decisis], however, rest on a single, generally unstated premise: the doctrine of stare decisis will control
the actions not only of a single justice, but of all (or at least of most) justices." Earl M.
Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: ChiefJustice Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis,
25 RUTGERS L.J. 669, 672-73 (1994).
284. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("Adhering to precedent 'is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than it be settled right."') (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
265-66 (1986); see also Powell, supra note 282, at 16 (stating that elimination of stare decisis would make the Constitution nothing more than what a majority of the Justices think).
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which the law will move and adjust their behavior accordingly.2 Theoretically, predictions concerning probable legal rules can be made with
more confidence when the law evolves gradually because evolution involves, by definition, less variation than sharp changes. Gradual evolution has less risk of disrupting settled expectations and therefore better
protects reliance that may have developed in response to earlier decisions. 6 Gradual changes provide the Court with a better opportunity to
measure the influence of legal change on behavior, and to calibrate the
law more precisely towards achieving desired social norms. Finally,
gradual evolution suggests a more measured and deliberative, and in that
sense, less political, process, and therefore better preserves the integrity
of the judicial process by tending to insulate courts from charges of
usurping political functions. 7
Despite these considerations, there are undoubtedly instances where a
direct reversal of a prior decision is more appropriate.2 8 In some cases, a
single, sharp change to a given rule may better promote predictability
and certainty than a series of decisions tacking back and forth while
steadily approaching the same result. In hindsight, the eventual goal of
either approach may be readily apparent, but the sharp change reveals
the eventual rule immediately, while the tacking suggests any number of
possible outcomes, without revealing the eventual rule until the final
tack. (And one can never be quite sure which tack is final.) 289 For similar
reasons, a single, sharp change in the law may disrupt settled expecta285. See W.M. Lile, Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis, 4 VA. L. REV. 95, 105
(1916):
A striking feature of the common law is its elasticity and its capacity to mould
and adjust itself to new needs and new conditions, and thus, by constant growth,
without haste but without rest, to keep pace with the enlightened public opinion
of the people by whom and for whom it has been fashioned.
Id.
286. The "now common device of prospective overruling" can also substantially accommodate reliance interests that may have developed. Monaghan, supra note 282, at 748
n.145.
287. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992) (plurality opinion of
Justice O'Connor) (noting that "the country can accept some correction of error without
necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the Court"); Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266 (suggesting
that stare decisis ensures precedent will be overruled only when the "proponent" of the
change overcomes a "heavy burden .... that changes in society or the law" are necessary
to serve a "greater objective").
288. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor) (identifying
"the repudiation of Adkins by West Coast Hotel and Plessy by Brown" as examples where
a single, sharp change was justified).
289. Cf. id. at 944-50 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.I., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part) (reexamining the Court's abortion cases and observing the "confused state" of the
jurisprudence).
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tions and reliance more substantially than any one, lesser change in the
law. But as between a single, sharp change to reach a given rule, and a
series of lesser changes that reach the same rule by steps, the expectations disrupted by the series of steps, taken as a whole, may well exceed
those of the single, sharp change, particularly if the series of decisions involves any missteps along the way. 9° As to the final two considerations,
desirability and integrity, a slow evolution will almost always better promote these objectives than outright reversal of the earlier decision. Only
in rare cases can the Court so readily determine the likely consequences
of a sharp change in constitutional doctrine that the desirability of such a
change is apparent and undertake that change without reminding the
public that the Court is, at times, a law-making and thus political entity.91
This discussion suggests that gradual evolution should be the norm for
Court-driven changes in constitutional doctrine, and outright reversal,
the exception.292 In theory, this would seem to suggest that the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts' approach to Miranda may be appropriate.
Rather than reverse the decision outright, a slow erosion of Miranda,
even if it establishes the same end result as overruling, may enable police, attorneys who work in the criminal justice process, and perhaps even
ordinary citizens, to predict somewhat more accurately and with somewhat more certainty the legal rules that will govern their activities encompassed by Miranda. It may also serve to distinguish the inappropriate "activism" of the Warren Court, from the more measured and
290. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (overruling Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877)). Pennoyer's holding that due process limited assertions of jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants to cases that satisfied either in rem or in personam requirements,
eventually created substantial uncertainty in the commercial area as the Court expanded
the concepts of "consent" and "presence" to address new situations arising from an industrialized and increasingly mobile society. See, e.g., Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213 (1921) (refusing to permit assertion of personal jurisdiction over corporate defendant in a lawsuit arising out of defendant's activities in the
forum, where the defendant had ceased to do business in the forum prior to commencement of the action); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (permitting forum state court to
assert in rem jurisdiction over a defendant by personal service on the defendant's debtor
who had entered the forum).
291. Outright reversal of an earlier constitutional decision may enhance the public's
view of the Court, and thereby encourage acquiescence to the Court's decisions where
time and societal change has rendered the earlier decision an anachronism. See Casey, 505
U.S. at 864 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (offering "the repudiation of Adkins by West
Coast Hotel and Plessy by Brown" as instances where circumstances had changed so substantially as to justify overruling the earlier decisions); id. at 959 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice O'Connor that West Coast Hotel and Brown represent decisions where the Court "enhanced its stature by acknowledging and correcting its error").
292. See Powell, supra note 282, at 15 ("But I repeat that the general rule of adherence
to prior decisions is a proper one.").
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judicious approaches of the later Courts.2 93

Yet, before embracing this conclusion, consider that several factors cut
sharply against this evaluation. First, in crafting the warnings and parallel enforcement rules, Miranda attempted to define bright-line rules that
could be readily understood by police and suspects alike. 294 Much of the
erosion in those rules has served to blur the relatively clear demarcations
that Miranda set forth.29 ' As a result, there is today a broader range of
conduct that will fall into a grey area where predictions concerning
Miranda's application will prove difficult. Second, the Court's path has
not always been steady. While the general direction since the early 1970s
has been toward erosion of Miranda, occasional decisions such as

293. Not all scholars have found the Burger Court's attempt at appearing less activist
than its predecessor convincing. See Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare
Decisis in ConstitutionalLaw, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 467, 467 (1981) ("It seems fair to say that
if a majority of the Warren or Burger Court has considered a case wrongly decided, no
constitutional precedent-new or old-has been safe.").
294. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979). In Fare,the Court stated:
Whatever the defects, if any, of this relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon the accused's request for an attorney, Miranda's holding
has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they
may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what
circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible.
This gain in specificity, which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been
thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy
and highly probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary
under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis.
Id.; see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 308 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
Court's adoption of an exception to the Miranda doctrine is incompatible with the principle, consistently applied by this Court, that the doctrine should remain simple and clear.");
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) ("One of the principal advantages of the
doctrine that suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody
is the clarity of that rule."); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984) (acknowledging
the "desirable clarity" of the Mirandarules).
295. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 610 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring):
[The plurality's] position, were it adopted by a majority of the Court, would necessitate difficult, time-consuming litigation over whether particular questions
asked during booking are "routine," whether they are necessary to secure biographical information, whether that information is itself necessary for recordkeeping purposes, and whether the questions are-despite their routine naturedesigned to elicit incriminating testimony.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); Perkins, 496 U.S. at 308-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting from
Court's adoption of "undercover agent" exception to Miranda) ("The Court's holding today complicates a previously clear and straightforward doctrine .... [T]he outer boundaries of the exception created by the Court are by no means clear."); Quarles, 467 U.S. at
658 (acknowledging that the public safety exception to Miranda warning requirement
"lessen[s] the desirable clarity of that rule").
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Withrow v. Williams296 and Edwards v. Arizona have moved sharply
against this trend by supporting and reinforcing Miranda9 Hindsight
clearly reveals which decisions form the trend and which the exceptions,
but it is unlikely that the eventual direction was so clear at the time each
new decision came down. This uneven path has also created uncertainty
among those forced to deal with the continually changing rules.2 99 Third,
in terms of reliance, while Miranda does not serve as a basis for the advanced planning entailed in commercial activities,3 °' Miranda and its
warnings have become one of the better known aspects of constitutional
law, recited nightly in our living rooms as part of one televised crime
drama or another. Yet, that popular presentation may prove misleading,
as it does not reflect Miranda'sincreasingly empty symbolism.30' Ironi296. 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (refusing to limit habeas corpus review of alleged Miranda
violations); see also Sonenshein, supra note 27, at 407-08 (noting that the Burger Court,
after establishing grounds "to overrule Miranda," seemingly reversed direction and
"breathed new life into Miranda").
297. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (following the letter and spirit of Miranda by prohibiting police from reinitiating questioning of suspect after he has invoked right to counsel); see also
supra text accompanying notes 227-28.
298. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 508 (8th ed.,
1994) (observing that the Court has interpreted Miranda fairly generously in some important respects and that "[iun the early 1980s Miranda seemed to enjoy a 'second honeymoon"').
299. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 352 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan noted in dissent:
Suffice it to say that the public will have understandable difficulty in comprehending how a confession obtained in violation of Miranda can at once be (1) "irrebuttabl[y]" presumed to be the product of official compulsion, and therefore
suppressible as a matter of federal constitutional law, and (2) "noncoerc[ed]" and
"wholly voluntary."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations ommitted).
Compare Edward Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual and the CriminalProcess: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 519 (1977) (arguing that the Burger
Court criminal law decisions revolve around an obsession with "factual guilt"), with Louis
Michael Seidman, FactualGuilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and
Change in Criminal Procedure,80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) (disagreeing with Professor Chase's perspective and arguing that the Burger Court criminal law decisions revolve around preoccupation with "crime prevention and control"). In addition, the erosion of Miranda has resulted in pockets of lower court caselaw in which these courts have
interpreted Miranda more narrowly than even the Court's own decisions would seemingly
support. See supra notes 162-65, 241-57 and accompanying text.
300. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1992) (noting that "the
classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the
commercial context, where advance planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity" (citation omitted)); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ("Considerations in
favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,
where reliance interests are involved ... ").
301. Consider, for example, law enforcement's "newest tactic" whereby an officer, af-
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cally, even the Mirandawarnings themselves may prove misleading given
the Court's erosion of the parallel enforcement rules.
Under these circumstances, honoring both the spirit and letter of
Miranda until such time as its undesirability became clear, as the Court
did with Lochner and Plessy, may have proved the better path given the
pragmatic consequences of revision. Moreover, characterizing the Burger/Rehnquist Courts' approach as gradual erosion is not entirely accurate. With true erosion, the Court itself is unclear of its eventual destination, and is working through the existing rule with an open mind,
evaluating and reevaluating its conclusions with each case presented.
There is little to suggest that the Burger/Rehnquist Courts ever had an
30 2 As
open mind concerning Miranda.
early as 1974, in Michigan v.
3
Tucker," the Burger Court's assault on Miranda'sconstitutional foundations strongly foreshadowed the Court's desired destination.3 O In dealing
with Miranda, the Court's approach seems more a deceptive ploy, designed to conceal the majority's new agenda, than a continuing reevaluation of Miranda'sproper place. Particularly in decisions such as Innis,3°5
where the Court's proposed standard seemed to support Miranda but its
application of the standard substantially undermined the interrogation

ter providing the suspect with Miranda warnings, attempts to engage him in conversation
about the crime by asking the suspect if he is willing to speak "'outside Miranda."' See
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 160 (1998). The suspect is expressly reassured that any information gained cannot be used at trial, and that
the officer is merely attempting to understand what happened. See id. at 160-61. Of
course, the officer fails to explain in a meaningful way that while the suspect's statement
cannot be used in the Government's case-in-chief, it may be used for impeachment and
lead to the discovery of additional evidence. See id. at 162. Police officers thereby convert
Miranda'swarning requirement into "a new and aggressive [law enforcement] tool." Id. at
161-62.
302. See Sonenshein, supra note 27, at 407 & n.12 ("Although the Burger Court has
not overruled Miranda, the Court has consistently undermined the rationales, assumptions, and values which gave Miranda life."); id. at 461 ("In its pre-1980 decision-making,
the Burger Court had shown its disdain for the assumptions which underlie Miranda and
had limited, misread, or ignored its holding at every apparent opportunity.").

303. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
304. See id. at 451 (concluding that the failure to provide full Miranda warnings does
not render an otherwise voluntary statement excludable); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile purporting to reaffirm these constitutional guarantees,
the Court has engaged of late in a studied campaign to strip the Miranda decision piecemeal and to undermine the rights Miranda sought to secure."); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 112 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Today's distortion of Miranda's constitutional principles can be viewed only as yet another step in the erosion and, I suppose, the
ultimate overruling of Miranda's enforcement of the privilege against selfincrimination.").
305. 446 U.S. 291 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 170-88 (discussing Innis).

The Erosion of Miranda

1999]

trigger,'06 the Court's mixed message strongly suggests a political, rather
than judicial, agenda.
Even with the full cooperation of the coordinate branches of government, the Court's ability to control physically the actions of the public,
directly affected individuals, such as police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants, or even other actors within the judicial branch, is
quite limited. The Court, and government more generally, depend heavily on the public's acquiescence, if not willing acceptance, of its rulings.
If the Court is to lead and not merely follow public opinion, maintaining
the appearance of propriety and abiding by the strictures of its institutional position become central concerns.
Even where its direct authority is the strongest, the Court has only
limited ability to review effectively the constitutional decisions of other
courts. In the Court's 1996 Term, for example, the Court considered
6687 petitions for certiorari, and reviewed on the merits only 168 cases,
or 2.5 percent.3°7 Though the Court can use summary dispositions to target certain areas for increased supervision,3 °8 these statistics reveal that
the vast majority of lower court decisions go unreviewed. Given its limited ability to undertake direct review, the Court relies heavily on the
honesty, respect, and good faith of the lower courts to abide by and fairly
enforce its rulings. If the lower courts were to resort to deceptiveness
and bad faith, pretending to heed the words of the Court while ignoring
its underlying substance, the Court's ability to rule even its own branch
would be substantially diminished. As a result, the Court must make
every effort to ensure that its own decisions deal honestly with earlier
cases. 3°9 Where the Court strays from such a path in considering its own
306. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01.
307. See The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, 111 HARV. L. REV. 51, 435 (1997). If these
statistics are broken down somewhat further to focus on in forma pauperis petitions,
where Miranda issues are often raised, the Court granted review on only 0.3 percent of
such petitions. See id.
308. See, e.g., Arthur D. Heilman, The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Remands
for Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 7 n.ll (1983) ("Summary reconsideration orders were extremely rare under Chief Justice Vinson (1946-1953) and in the first nine Terms under
Chief Justice Warren; no more than a dozen can be found in any one Term. The 1962
Term marked a turning point: there were more than 60 such dispositions."); J. Mitchell
Armbruster, Note, Deciding Not to Decide: The Supreme Court's Expanding Use of the
"GVR" Power Continued in Thomas v. American Home Products Inc. and Department of
the Interior v. South Dakota, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1387, 1387-88 (1998) (noting that summary
proceedings where Court grants certiorari, vacates the lower court's decision, and remands
for reconsideration "have been issued regularly since use of the procedure rose dramatically in the 1960s").
309.
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past decisions, as it has with Miranda, it should not be surprised when the
lower courts do likewise with the Court's decisions, past and present,
more generally.
Attacking Miranda'sconstitutional foundations involves similar pragmatic consequences. On its own, systematically narrowing and limiting
Miranda'sscope and effectiveness inherently conveys the admission that
the Court now believes that Miranda was wrongly decided. Such an admission of past mistake almost certainly serves as a reminder that the
present Court may also be mistaken. Going further and questioning the
very legitimacy of an earlier decision casts a similar, though darker,
shadow over the present Court because it inevitably suggests that if the
Court had behaved illegitimately in the past, it may just as well be doing
so now. If the Court treats its prior decisions without respect, it invites
others to treat its present decisions similarly. In consequence, the Burger/Rehnquist Courts' treatment of Mirandaposes a threat to the Court's
institutional legitimacy, and therefore authority, that extends far beyond
Mirandaitself."1
In the end, the Court's voice is its only tool. While an occasional contradiction is not necessarily fatal, the presence of repeated vacillation,
disrespect, and deception in its words tend to diminish directly the
Court's influence and authority."' Perhaps the Rehnquist and Burger
Courts believed that the Warren Court assumed too much authority, and
therefore set out to weaken the Court's institutional position intentionally through their treatment of Mirandaand other legacies of the Warren
Court. But regardless of their purpose, there is little doubt that institutional weakening has been the effect. Even if one is otherwise untrouAPPEALS 257 (1960):

It is not the occasional overt overruling of older doctrine which is cankering
the confidence of counselor and advocate, it is the quag-footing of the everyday,
the felt parlousness of any hold at all for hand or foot, since the mere words upon
the page, when read just as doctrine, do deceive, and since so many still grope
and stumble, blind as yet to the fact and nature of the real reckonabilities in the

courts' work. One can almost urge that a frank overruling, when it does crop up,
brings with it something of relief: that point, at least, can for a while be counted
on as clear.
Id.
310.

See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor) (ob-

serving that "[tihe Court's power lies, rather in its legitimacy... .
311. See id. at 865-66:
There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior
Courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of prior rulings would be

taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to
drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would
fade with the frequency of its vacillation.
Id. at 866.

1999]

The Erosion of Miranda

bled by Miranda's substantive erosion or favors undermining the decision due to its supposed impact on the criminal justice system, the
Court's disingenuous approach towards Miranda is objectionable. Undertaken too soon, with too little reason, deceptively implemented, and
driven by nothing more than a change in the Court's membership,3"2 the
erosion of Miranda represents precisely the sort of political decision that
will "seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power
and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule
'
of law."313
V. THE PATH AHEAD
In terms of the Court's institutional integrity, in comparing Miranda to
the decisions that came after, Miranda is readily seen as the more legitimate. While the Miranda Court may have stretched constitutional doctrine to reach its result, the Court seemed to acknowledge doing so.31 4
Moreover, regardless of the arguments asserted against Miranda, it was
not an ill-considered lark. The Warren Court embraced the approach set
forth in Miranda only after thirty years of voluntariness cases had plainly
revealed both the coercion that can arise in custodial police interrogation
and the failure of the voluntariness standard to address that coercion
adequately. While the decision undoubtedly imposed some burden on
law enforcement activities, it did not prohibit custodial police interrogation altogether, but chose instead to strike a more protective, yet still
reasonable, balance between suspect and law enforcement.315
In contrast, the Burger Court waited only five years before beginning
to dismantle Miranda as constitutional doctrine. Its basis for doing so
was surprisingly weak. Given the very short time Miranda had been in
312.

See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 320 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Court's decision says much about the way the Court currently goes about
implementing its agenda. In imposing its new rule, for example, the Court mischaracterizes our precedents, obfuscates the central issues, and altogether ignores the practical realities of custodial interrogation that have led nearly every
lower court to reject its simplistic reasoning.

Id.
313. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865 (plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor).
314. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("[W]e cannot say that the Con-

stitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted."); see also supra notes 70-78

and accompanying text.
315. See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 2, at 460-61 ("The Miranda
decision, of course, was a compromise. It did not eliminate all possibilities for abusive interrogation, and it stopped far short of barring all pressured or ill-considered waivers of
Fifth Amendment rights.").
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force, the impetus for change could scarcely have been any substantial
change in factual conditions or social perceptions of those conditions, or
a fair assessment of Miranda'simpact on law enforcement. The new justices of the Burger Court simply exercised the authority they had received as political appointees to begin rewriting Miranda's constitutional
doctrine to reflect their personal preconceptions."' More troubling,
where Miranda was forthright, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were
deceptive, pretending, for example, that Miranda was not constitutionally-based on the one hand, while continuing to impose on the States
their interpretation of Mirandaon the other.
Stare decisis and the pragmatic consequences it embodies do not necessarily mean that Miranda must survive, although they do suggest that
the costs of directly overruling Miranda may be excessively high. But if
Miranda is to be reversed, better that it be done honestly and forthrightly, rather than by deception and degrees. Honest disagreement
about constitutional doctrine and associated policy concerns will always
have a place on the Court and in its decisions, but disrespect and deception should not.

316. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 943 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun frankly acknowledged the
politicizing of the Court on the abortion issue:
In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of THE CHIEF
JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA. And yet, in another sense, the distance between
the two approaches is short-the distance is but a single vote.
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two
worlds will be made.

